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How To Deal with Laboratory Reports Under
Crawford v. Washington: A Question with
No Good Answer
CYRUS P.W. RIECK*
I. A "MIASMA OF UNCERTAINTY"'
In what would later turn out to be a complete abandonment of
twenty-four years of Confrontation Clause2 jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court, in Crawford v. Washington,' "discovered" for the first time in
over two hundred years the true meaning of the Sixth Amendment. In so
discovering, the Court, led by Justice Antonin Scalia, created a "miasma
of uncertainty."
It can be argued that, in Crawford, Justice Scalia set out to, and
succeeded in, precluding the "admissibility of grand jury testimony,
interlocking confessions, and collateral incriminating statements against
penal interest."4 This article focuses, however, not on the intended
effects of Crawford and its Supreme Court progeny, Davis v. Washing-
ton5 and Whorton v. Bockting,6 but on their unintended effects; namely,
the cases' effects on the admissibility of government-created or
requested laboratory reports and the like in state-court criminal proceed-
ings7 in lieu of live, in-court testimony by the preparer of such reports.
As the decisions documented in this article demonstrate, in regard to
* J.D. Candidate 2008, University of Miami School of Law. The author extends special
thanks to Professor Michael H. Graham. Without Professor Graham's critique, insight, and
guidance, this note would not have been possible.
1. United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 2005) (describing the Supreme Court's
failure to define the parameters of testimonial hearsay in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004), as producing a "miasma of uncertainty").
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 2 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him . ) (emphasis added).
3. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
4. Michael H. Graham, Special Report: Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct.
1354, 158 L. Ed.2d 177 (2004), 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 58, 77 (2006) [hereinafter Graham, Special
Report].
5. 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (Scalia, J.).
6. 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007).
7. This article focuses on Crawford's effects on the admissibility of laboratory reports under
the Confrontation Clause in state courts. Federal courts, of course, have been presented with the
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such reports, the miasma of uncertainty turns from a haze to an insuffer-
able smog.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: 1980
THROUGH THE PRESENT
Confrontation Clause cases can be separated into two broad catego-
ries: those involving "the admission of out-of-court statements"8 and
those "involving restrictions imposed by law or by the trial court on the
scope or extent of cross-examination face to face with the accused." 9
Crawford and this article are concerned with the former category.
Before Crawford, Ohio v. Roberts governed the admissibility of out-of-
court statements under the Confrontation Clause.' ° Roberts stated that
when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial,
the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is
unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without
more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hear-
say exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.l'
Upon a cursory glance at Roberts, the above quotation would appear to
make unavailability the sine qua non of admissibility of hearsay state-
ments in criminal proceedings. But several factors apparent at the time
of Roberts and borne out in subsequent cases demonstrated that such
was not the case.' 2 To make a long story short, from 1980 through 2004
and Crawford, the relationship between the admissibility of hearsay in
criminal proceedings and the Confrontation Clause could be summarized
by the following: "If it was good enough for the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, it was good enough for the confrontation clause. ''13
The ease of application notwithstanding, at least one practical result
of the Roberts standard irked Justice Scalia and a majority of the Court
enough to overrule twenty-four years of precedent and completely
reformulate how the Confrontation Clause is understood. That result
being the admissibility of collateral incriminating statements against
same issue, but the issue has been addressed far less frequently and often in less depth. For an
overview of federal-court application of Crawford to laboratory reports, see infra note 86.
8. 4 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 802:2, at 6-8 (6th ed.
2006) [hereinafter GRAHAM, HANDBOOK].
9. Id. at 8 (footnote omitted).
10. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
11. Id. at 66.
12. See 4 GRAHAM, HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 802:2, at 20-23 (describing the several
factors that suggested that the Supreme Court did not intend such a stringent unavailability
requirement as well as later cases substantiating such a view).
13. Id. at 46.
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penal interests offered against the criminal defendant. 14  Despite an
attempt in Lilly v. Virginia to prevent the use of such statements,15 the
Court's failure, among other things, to reach a single majority opinion
left "ample wiggle room for lower courts to permit a custodial statement
to law enforcement personnel into evidence if so inclined in spite of the
clear tenor of a majority of the justices to the contrary." 6 This "wiggle
room" seems to be what ultimately precipitated the Court's decision in
Crawford. Although the Court's distaste for the use of collateral incrim-
inating statements against penal interests offered against the criminal
defendant is certainly justified, the means used in Crawford to ensure,
once and for all, that such statements would not be admitted into evi-
dence leaves much to be desired.
Crawford involved an in-custody and post-Miranda statement to
the police by the defendant's wife in an assault and attempted murder
prosecution. The wife's statement tended to show that the defendant
was the first aggressor, despite his claim of self-defense. The wife did
not testify in court because of a claim of privilege. The out-of-court
testimony, however, was admissible under Washington privilege law.
The wife's tape-recorded statement was admitted under the Washington
exception to the hearsay rule for statements against penal interests.' 7 In
response, the Supreme Court turned to the "historical background of the
Clause to understand its meaning"' 8 and found that the admission of the
wife's statement violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confronta-
tion rights. After a historical overview of the rationale for the Confron-
tation Clause stretching back to, and focusing on, the 1603 trial of Sir
14. The "collateral inculpatory statement" exception to the hearsay rule, as the exception is
alternatively known, can be found in FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). The rule reads:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if
the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making
so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended
to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability ... that a reasonable person in
the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be
true.
Id. (emphasis added). An example of such a collateral inculpatory statement would be an
assertion that "Josh and I robbed the liquor store" admitted at Josh's trial for robbery of the liquor
store. See generally MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: AN INTRODUCTORY PROBLEM APPROACH
189-94 (2002).
15. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
16. 4 GRAHAM, HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 802:2, at 33-34 (explaining why such "wiggle
room" remained).
17. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004) (citing WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)). The
trial court deemed the wife's statement to be self-inculpatory because she led the defendant to the
victim's apartment. Id.
18. Id. at 43.
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Walter Raleigh for treason,19 Justice Scalia and the Court concluded that
history "supports two inferences about the meaning of the Sixth Amend-
ment."'20 The first inference is that "the principal evil at which the Con-
frontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal
procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence
against the accused. '21 From this initial inference, the Court rejected the
proposition that the application of the Confrontation Clause to out-of-
court statements introduced in a criminal trial turned on the law of evi-
dence.22 To accept such a proposition, the Court noted, would "render
the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant
inquisitorial practices. ' 23 As a corollary, the Court found that "not all
hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment's core concerns. '"24 The Court
stated:
An off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence and thus
a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but it bears little
resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause
targeted. On the other hand, ex parte examinations might sometimes
be admissible under modem hearsay rules, but the Framers certainly
would not have condoned them.25
The text of the Confrontation Clause, the Court reasoned, reflects such a
focus. Using definitions from the 1828 version of Webster's Diction-
ary,26 the Court set out to define the meaning of "witnesses" and "testi-
mony." "Witnesses" against the accused, said the Court, applies to those
who "bear testimony. ' 27 "Testimony" was defined as typically "[a] sol-
emn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact. 28 It was therefore clear to the Court that the text of
the Constitution, in accord with the history underlying the common-law
right of confrontation, "reflects an especially acute concern with a spe-
cific type of out-of-court statement. '29 Thus, in 2004, the primary con-
cern of the Confrontation Clause became those hearsay statements that
are "testimonial" in nature.3°
19. See Raleigh's Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1 (1603).
20. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 50-51.
23. Id. at 51.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. The Sixth Amendment was ratified in 1791.
27. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
28. Id. (quoting WEBSTER, supra note 27) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 53.
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According to the Court, the Confrontation Clause's history supports
a second inference, "that the Framers would not have allowed admission
of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless
he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportu-
nity for cross-examination." 3 In sum, when testimonial statements are
involved, they may be admitted only when the declarant is unavailable
and when the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
him. In Crawford, the unavailability requirement, which had not been
the sine qua non under Roberts, became such, at least in regard to testi-
monial hearsay, and in addition there needed to have been afforded a
prior opportunity to cross.
The category of hearsay statements within the purview of the Con-
frontation Clause was, to put it gently, not as meticulously defined. It
was clear that the Confrontation Clause was "primarily" concerned with
testimonial hearsay. Just what this term encompassed, however, was far
from certain. The Court "le[ft] for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of 'testimonial."' 32 It stated, however, that
"[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testi-
mony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a formal trial;
and to police interrogations."33 At the same time, the Court noted three
various formulations of the core class of testimonial statements that "all
share a common nucleus and then define the Clause's coverage at vari-
ous levels of abstraction around it."' 34 Additionally, the Court refused to
decide whether the Confrontation Clause applied solely to testimonial
hearsay, 35 and it seemed as if the Court was considering retaining Rob-
erts in regard to nontestimonial hearsay. The Court stated, "[w]here
nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Fram-
ers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hear-
say law-as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such
31. Id. at 53-54.
32. Id. at 68.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 52. These three formulations, which have led to much confusion over the Court's
intended meaning of "testimonial" and will be discussed later in this article, are
ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorially[;] extrajudicial statements . . . contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions; [and] statements that were made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial.
Id. at 51-52 (ellipsis in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
35. Id. at 53 ("[E]ven if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial
hearsay, that is its primary object .... ").
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statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether. 36
The Court's refusal to offer a "comprehensive definition" of "testi-
monial" led lower courts to employ "a plethora of interpretations" of the
term, often leading to conflicting results.37 After Crawford, however,
and despite two of the three formulations offered for the definition of
testimonial referring to expectations of the declarant, the true focus of
the Confrontation Clause was "solely upon government conduct in
acquiring evidence against the accused."38 Formality also appeared to
be the key to discovering the true meaning of "testimonial." Yet under
Davis, it is clear that only governmental conduct is in fact significantly
involved in determining whether a statement is testimonial.
In Davis v. Washington,39 the Supreme Court consolidated two
cases on Writs of Certiorari to the supreme courts of Washington and
Indiana in State v. Davis4" and Hammon v. State.41 Both cases were
precipitated by domestic disputes resulting in statements made by the
defendant's significant others (the putative victims) to law-enforcement
officers.42 Neither declarant testified at trial. The Court, "[w]ithout
attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable
statements" 43 that are testimonial or nontestimonial, held:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the pri-
mary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circum-
stances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency,
and the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.4 4
In a footnote, the Court noted that although interrogations in some cir-
cumstances tend to generate testimonial responses, this does not imply
that "statements made in the absence of any interrogation are necessarily
36. Id. at 68. In Davis, the Court chose the latter approach, overruling Roberts and holding
that the Confrontation Clause is only concerned with testimonial hearsay.
37. 4 GRAHAM, HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 802:2.1, at 3 (Supp. 2008).
38. Graham, Special Report, supra note 4, at 108 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 107-09
(explaining why the reference to the "reasonable" expectations of the declarant is an example of
an antinomy and that the history offered by the Court supports only the two inferences referenced
in Crawford, which in turn support a definition of testimonial limited to a focus on such
governmental conduct).
39. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
40. 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005).
41. 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
42. In Davis, the defendant's girlfriend's statement was to a 911 operator. The Court treated
the operator's acts to be those of the police for purposes of the opinion but stated that "our holding
today makes it unnecessary to consider whether and when statements made to someone other than
law enforcement personnel are 'testimonial.'" 547 U.S. at 823 n.2.
43. Id. at 822.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
(Vol. 62:839
2008]LABORATORY REPORTS UNDER CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 845
nontestimonial.' 45
In State v. Davis, the declarant's statements to a 911 operator were
deemed nontestimonial to the extent they referred to "events as they
were actually happening, rather than describ[ing] past events. 46 The
operator received the declarant's statements regarding ongoing violence
and threats of violence by the defendant not to prove a past fact but to
enable the operator to respond to current circumstances necessitating
police assistance.47 The "primary purpose" of the interrogation, viewed
objectively, was to "meet an ongoing emergency. '48  Therefore, the
statements' admission at trial as an excited utterance was not a violation
of the Confrontation Clause.
By contrast, in Hammon v. State, the police, responding to a
domestic-disturbance report, found the declarant who was also the
defendant's wife sitting on the front porch looking "somewhat fright-
ened."' 49  Despite her appearance, the declarant told the police that
"nothing was the matter."50 Upon entering the house, the police found a
broken furnace and glass on the floor.5 The police approached the
defendant in the kitchen where he informed the police "that he and his
wife had been in an argument but everything was fine now and the argu-
ment never became physical."52 The police again approached the
declarant who was now inside and asked her what had happened. The
police rebuffed the defendant's several attempts to involve himself in the
conversation. The declarant eventually told the officer what had
occurred and, on the officer's request, filled out and signed a battery
affidavit that was admitted at trial as a present-sense impression. Noting
that determinating the statement's character in Hammon was "a much
easier task,"'53 the Davis Court found it to be testimonial. The Court
stated that "[i]t is entirely clear from the circumstances that the interro-
gation was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct-
45. Id. n.1.
46. Id. at 827 (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999)) (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 828. The Court was careful to note that despite the declarant's initial statements
being nontestimonial-largely because the defendant who had just beaten the declarant was still in
close proximity-this did not mean that the interrogation could not "evolve into testimonial
statements." Id. (quoting Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 457 (Ind. 2005)). In fact, this seems
to be exactly what occurred once the defendant fled and the operator told the declarant "to be
quiet, and proceeded to pose a battery of questions." Id.
49. Id. at 819 (quoting Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 446).
50. Id. (quoting Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 447).
51. Id.
52. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id. at 829.
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as, indeed, the testifying officer expressly acknowledged."54 In sum, the
critical difference between the nontestimonial statements in State v.
Davis and the testimonial ones in Hammon v. State was that, viewed
objectively, the primary purpose of the interrogation in the former was
to determine "what is happening" as opposed to in the latter where such
purpose was to determine "what happened.""
Davis and its self-proclaimed narrow holding, 6 while certainly far
from remedying the "miasma of uncertainty" created by Crawford, did
make certain aspects of the newfound Confrontation Clause clearer. 7
First, consistent with the two historical inferences described in Craw-
ford, "the confrontation clause focuses solely upon conduct by govern-
ment officials."58 Second, the Confrontation Clause applies only to
testimonial statements.5 9  Third, and related to the preceding point,
Crawford did in fact overrule Roberts.6° And finally, though not
explicit in Crawford or Davis, it appears as if the theory underlying the
decisions is
that police officers, other law enforcement personnel, and judicial
officers in the process of eliciting statements from witnesses act
improperly through intimidation, coercion, bribery, deceit, etc., and
also that such government officials under oath at trial fabricate and
distort statements actually received from the witness. Moreover, in
this context alone for the first time Crawford and Davis also clearly
imply that oath, demeanor, and cross-examination, the traditional
common law methods for evaluating the truth of in-court testimony,
are not up to the task; i.e., the jury will misevaluate the government
54. Id. (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 830.
56. Id. n.5 ("We have acknowledged that our holding is not an 'exhaustive classification of all
conceivable statements-or even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation,'
but rather a resolution of the cases before us and those like them.") (citation omitted). But see
Michael H. Graham, The Davis Narrowing of Crawford: Is the Primary Purpose Test of Davis
Jurisprudentially Sound, "Workable," and "Predictable"?, 42 CRiM. L. BULL. 604, 610 (2006)
[hereinafter Graham, The Davis Narrowing] ("In short, while Davis expressly states that it is not
presenting a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial,' Davis may nevertheless in fact have done
so or come very close to having done so and thus be the 'another day' referred to in Crawford.").
57. The adjective "clearer" is used intentionally and in juxtaposition to the word "clear," for
there is little in either Crawford or Davis that can properly be regarded as "clear."
58. Graham, The Davis Narrowing, supra note 56, at 612.
59. Davis, 547 U.S. at 823-24. In response to whether the Confrontation Clause applies only
to testimonial hearsay, the Court states that the testimonial limitation "so clearly reflected in the
text of the constitutional provision must fairly be said to mark out not merely its 'core,' but its
perimeter." Id. at 824; see also Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1183 (2007) ("But
whatever improvement in reliability Crawford produced in this respect must be considered
together with Crawford's elimination of Confrontation Clause protection against the admission of
unreliable out-of-court nontestimonial statements.").
60. Davis, 547 U.S. at 825 n.4 ("We overruled Roberts in Crawford by restoring the
unavailability and cross-examination requirements.").
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official's testimony to the detriment of the criminal defendant.6 '
Unfortunately, as shown by what is generally a complete lack of consis-
tency by state courts in the treatment of laboratory reports, the Court's
definition of testimonial in specific and the Confrontation Clause in gen-
eral is still utterly lacking and seems to provide no answer to the ques-
tion whether such reports are testimonial.
Under Teague v. Lane62 and its progeny, a unanimous Court in
Wharton v. Bockting6 3 held that the rule set forth in Crawford is not
retroactive and does not apply to cases already final on direct review.64
Offering essentially no further guidance as to when statements will be
testimonial, the Court held that Crawford set forth a "new" procedural
rule because "[t]he Crawford rule is flatly inconsistent with the prior
governing precedent, Roberts, which Crawford overruled. '6' Further,
the Court held that Crawford "did not alter our understanding of the
bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding. 66
Rather, "Crawford overruled Roberts because Roberts was inconsistent
with the original understanding of the meaning of the Confrontation
Clause, not because the court reached the conclusion that the overall
effect of the Crawford rule would be to improve the accuracy of fact
finding in criminal trials. '67 The Court reiterated that the Confrontation
Clause is concerned solely with testimonial hearsay-"nontestimonial
hearsay [is] not governed by that Clause. '68 The Court again reiterated
that "the Roberts test was too 'malleable' in permitting the admission of
ex parte testimonial statements. '"69 Thus, while it is clear that the Con-
frontation Clause's "procedural" guarantee applies solely to testimonial
statements, the breadth of this guarantee is still woefully uncertain.
III. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF LABORATORY REPORTS7 °
BEFORE CRAWFORD
Crawford did not create the uncertainty regarding the admissibility
61. Graham, The Davis Narrowing, supra note 56, at 612.
62. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
63. 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007).
64. Id. at 1177.
65. Id. at 1181.
66. Id. at 1183 (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Id. at 1182-83.
68. Id. at 1179.
69. Id.
70. The cases in this article generally involve reports of the results of tests of substances
presumed to be narcotics; blood, urine, and breath testing; breath-test machine maintenance and
calibration; autopsies; and fingerprint analysis. For ease of communication, these sorts of reports
will generically be referred to as "laboratory reports" despite not always being performed in a
laboratory per se. If the analysis turns on a specific type of report, such will be called to the
reader's attention.
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of laboratory reports in lieu of the preparer's in-court testimony under
the Confrontation Clause. The case, however, has thrown the proverbial
"rock into a hornet's nest." To understand the confusion surrounding
the admissibility of laboratory reports after Crawford, it is useful to
understand how such reports were treated in the past.
Before Roberts, courts were split about whether the admission of
laboratory reports without testimony of the preparer of the report vio-
lated the Confrontation Clause.71 After Roberts this lack of uniformity
persisted.72 The three most prevalent rationales73 for admitting labora-
tory reports in lieu of the preparer's testimony were as follows. 74 First,
many courts found that because the utility of cross-examining the person
who actually performed the tests and prepared the report was remote,
admission of the report without the testimony of the preparer was not a
violation of the Confrontation Clause.75 As a corollary, many courts
were willing to admit laboratory reports through the testimony of super-
visors of the preparer of the report. These courts generally believed that
an opportunity to cross-examine the supervisor was adequate given the
limited utility in cross-examining the person who ran the tests.76 Courts
also considered the practical ramifications of requiring in-court testi-
mony of the preparer of the report whenever such a report was sought to
be admitted.77 Second, many courts asserted that because laboratory
71. See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE § 6.04[a],
at 365-66 (4th ed. 2007) (listing cases both finding and not finding a constitutional violation).
72. Id. at 366.
73. Courts used a number of rationales to find laboratory reports admissible under Roberts.
The three listed were the most common and most other rationales were the logical descendents of
those listed here.
74. It should be noted that the rationales for admitting laboratory reports were not exclusive
before Crawford nor are they following the case. Courts often cite a number of different
rationales as to why laboratory reports are or are not admissible.
75. E.g., Price v. State, 498 S.E.2d 262, 264 (Ga. 1998) (report admissible because "the utility
of cross examination is so remote"); State v. Smith, 323 S.E.2d 316, 324 (N.C. 1984) (report
admissible; "It is unlikely in cases such as the case before us that cross-examination of the
chemical analyst at trial could successfully call into question the declaration's apparent meaning
or the declarant's sincerity, perception or memory. Rather, to require every analyst to testify in
such cases would be unduly inconvenient and of small utility.") (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); State v. Sosa, 800 P.2d 839, 842 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (report admissible;
persons preparing the report are "unlikely to recall the details of the transaction or event in
question") (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. See Williams v. State, 734 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (concurring
opinion) (laboratory report admitted under state business-records hearsay exception through the
testimony of laboratory supervisor did not violate the Confrontation Clause); State v. Christian,
895 P.2d 676, 682-83 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (laboratory supervisor lays foundation for report;
preparer of report does not testify; no Confrontation Clause violation).
77. See Smith, 323 S.E.2d at 319 (admitting laboratory report; "[A]Ithough the right of
confrontation is a fundamental right, it 'must occasionally give way to considerations of public
policy and the necessities of the case.'") (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243
(1895)); Commonwealth v. Kravontka, 558 A.2d 865, 868 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (admitting
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reports do not involve the rendering of "opinions" or drawing inferences
by the preparer of the report, admission into evidence would not violate
the Confrontation Clause.78 Finally, and most prevalently, many courts
deemed laboratory reports to bear adequate "indicia of reliability" under
Roberts either by falling within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception"79 or
by a "showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"80 and
thus admissible under the Confrontation Clause.8
Not all courts, however, were willing to admit laboratory reports
without the preparer's in-court testimony.82 For instance, when the lab-
oratory report was crucial to the prosecution and the utility of cross-
examining the preparer was not remote, some courts found admission of
the report absent the preparer's in-court testimony to violate the Con-
frontation Clause.83 At times, other courts found that lab reports did not
contain adequate "indicia of reliability" under Roberts.84
laboratory report without testimony of preparer; "A rule requiring production of available
witnesses would significantly curtail development of the law of evidence to eliminate the
necessity for production of declarants where production would be unduly inconvenient and of
small utility to a defendant.") (emphasis added) (quoting Dutton v. Evans 400 U.S. 74, 96-97
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
78. See Bowers v. State, 468 A.2d 101, 112 (Md. 1983) (autopsy report admissible in lieu of
testimony of preparing physician; "[R]eport here merely stated findings as to the physical
condition of the victim."); Smith, 323 S.E.2d at 324 (no Confrontation Clause violation; "The
analyst is at no time called upon to render an opinion or to draw conclusions.").
79. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
80. Id.
81. See People v. Clark, 833 P.2d 561, 628 (Cal. 1992) (autopsy report admitted under state
official record exception; no Confrontation Clause violation as "[tlhe contents of [the doctor's]
report were admitted under a 'firmly rooted' exception to the hearsay rule that carries sufficient
indicia of reliability"); Ealy v. State, 685 N.E.2d 1047, 1055 (Ind. 1997) (autopsy report
admissible without testimony of preparing physician under the Confrontation Clause because it
contains sufficient "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" and the preparing physician did
not know whether the particular case would result in trial or whom the potential defendant might
be); Kravontka, 558 A.2d at 870 (blood-alcohol tests and records thereof bear "overwhelming"
indicia of reliability and are admissible under the Confrontation Clause without testimony of the
preparer); State v. Sosa, 800 P.2d 839, 843 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (report admitted under state
statutory hearsay exception for certified copies of laboratory reports is reliable evidence because
(1) the lab expert is particularly worthy of belief and (2) the statute admitting the report is "at least
as reliable as a 'firmly rooted' hearsay exception").
82. See 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 71, § 6.04[a], at 364-70.
83. See Grantham v. State, 580 So. 2d 53, 57 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (finding a Confrontation
Clause violation where the prosecutor did not show the toxicologist to be unavailable and "[u]nder
the facts of this particular case ... the utility of confronting the absent toxicologist was not remote
... the report was both 'crucial' to the prosecution and 'devastating' to [the defendant]").
84. See People v. McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470, 475 (Ill. 2000) (finding statute calling for
admissibility of laboratory reports to be unconstitutional, noting "lab reports admissible pursuant
to [the statute] neither contain particularized guarantees of trustworthiness nor fall within a firmly
established hearsay exception"); In re J.H., 581 A.2d 1347, 1351 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)
(finding Confrontation Clause violation where lab report admitted under statute allowing
certificate of forensic laboratory employee to show composition of substance because trial court
did not refer to evidence rules and "did not require the State to satisfy the tests of reliability").
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Many of the rationales offered under the Roberts regime for either
finding or not finding a Confrontation Clause violation with the admis-
sion of laboratory reports without the preparer's in-court testimony sur-
vive today. It seems clear, however, that given the drastic change in the
theory underlying the Confrontation Clause,85 theories regarding undr
what circumstances lab report are admissible should have changed as
well. But just how the arguments for or against the admissibility of lab
reports should have changed after Crawford is unclear because the theo-
retical underpinnings of the case are vague, and, when taken to their
logical conclusions, lead to perverse and illogical results. Courts
attempting to cope with the testimonial-nontestimonial dichotomy set
forth in Crawford have also created a number of new rationales. But the
lack of any coherent theory regarding whether and why such laboratory
reports are admissible is a manifestation of the fact that Crawford and
Davis are incompetent to answer the question adequately.
IV. THE MIASMA THICKENS: STATE COURT RATIONALES 86 FOR THE
ADMISSIBILITY (OR INADMISSIBILITY) OF LABORATORY REPORTS IN LIEU
OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE PREPARER UNDER CRAWFORD AND DAVIS8 7
A. Business Records: Nontestimonial or Perhaps Nontestimonial;
Holding or Dicta?
In the context of considering the Confrontation Clause's history,
85. The change in theory being in essence one from Roberts and a concern for "reliability" to
CrawfordlDavis and an abhorrence of "ex parte examinations" by government officials coupled
with a belief that juries cannot properly evaluate the testimony of government officials.
86. Using many of the same rationales as state courts, though many times with much less
depth of analysis, federal courts have more often than not found laboratory reports to be
nontestimonial. See United States v. washington, 498 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2007) (raw data
created by machine operated by technician is not hearsay and is nontestimonial; "[T]he supposed
'hearsay statements' made by the machines were not 'testimonial' in that they did not involve the
relation of a past fact of history as would be done by a witness."); United States v. Earle, 488 F.3d
537, 543, 545 (1st Cir. 2007) (testimonial issue not resolved; but certificate of nonexistence of a
record ("CNR") may be testimonial; defendant presents a strong argument that "the CNR qualifies
as testimonial under all three of the formulations provided in Crawford"); United States v. Henry,
472 F.3d 910, 914 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (the rules of evidence governing expert testimony were left
unaffected by Crawford; "[W]hile the Supreme Court in Crawford altered Confrontation Clause
precedent, it said nothing about the Clause's relation to Federal Rule of Evidence 703."); United
States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (autopsy report is nontestimonial; "[W]e hold
that where a statement is properly determined to be a business record as defined by FED. R. EVID.
803(6), it is not testimonial within the meaning of Crawford, even where the declarant is aware
that it may be available for later use at trial."); United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 926-27 (7th
Cir. 2006) (medical records establishing the presence of narcotics are nontestimonial; "[W]hen
these professionals made those observations, they-like the declarant reporting an emergency in
Davis-were 'not acting as ... witness[es];' and were 'not testifying.' ") (alterations in original);
United States v. Adams, No. 03-2108, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 17291, at *8 (3d Cir. July 10, 2006)
(no Confrontation Clause violation where expert permitted to testify to results of laboratory report
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the Crawford majority states, "[m]ost of the hearsay exceptions covered
statements that by their nature were not testimonial-for example, busi-
ness records .... 88 This seemingly innocuous statement has led to a
potpourri of interpretations by state courts grappling with the issue
whether laboratory reports are admissible in lieu of in-court testimony
by the preparer.
1. THE ABOVE-QUOTED BUSINESS-RECORDS REFERENCE IN CRAWFORD
IS A HOLDING
Faced with the question whether a proffered laboratory report is
testimonial, a number of courts have regarded the business-records refer-
ence in Crawford as a holding, finding the report to be nontestimonial. 89
he did not perform; "[Blecause appellants fail to show (or even argue) that they were somehow
prevented from calling these 'actual' witnesses themselves, their reliance on Crawford is
untenable."); United States v. Rahamin, No. 04-1982, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 4695, at *14 (3d
Cir. Feb. 23, 2006) ("[T]he DEA laboratory report appears to be a testimonial statement since it
was offered to prove the weight and substance of the 20,000 confiscated pills."); United States v.
Gaines, No. 02-4378, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14168, at *37 (6th Cir. July 7, 2004) (ability to
cross-examine expert who did not prepare laboratory report satisfies the Confrontation Clause;
"[The defendant] received the opportunity to cross examine [the testifying expert] regarding the
laboratory reports, the tests performed, and the test results. That is all the Confrontation Clause
requires."); Ellington v. Grams, No. 07-C-136, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85016, at *13-14 (E.D.
Wis. Nov. 8, 2007) (victim's medical records are nontestimonial; "Medical records documenting
the victim's hospital treatment here were not made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the[y] would be available for later use at a later trial.")
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. De La Cruz, No. 01-
10118-JLT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65172, at *8 (D. Mass. Aug. 30, 2007) (expert witness
permitted to testify based on laboratory reports he did not prepare; "No Crawford violation
occurred here because [the testifying expert's] statements were not testimonial hearsay."); United
States v. James, No. 02-CR-0778 (SJ), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67538, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 21,
2007) (toxicology report prepared by nontestifying medical examiner employed by the medical
examiner's office is nontestimonial; "There is no indication that [the nontestifying medical
examiner] was employed by a law enforcement agency or was responsible for enforcing any
laws."); United States v. Krieger, No. 06-cr-40001-JPG, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37941, at *8
(S.D. Ill. May 24, 2007) ("While the court is inclined to agree that the admission of [the] autopsy
report would be impermissible under Crawford, it finds that the introduction of the physical
products of that investigation will not present a Crawford issue."); Tavares v. O'Brien, No. 04-
40059-FDS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73983, at *21 (D. Mass. Mar. 7, 2007) ("Hospital records ...
are nontestimonial and therefore, if they otherwise comply with the rules of evidence, may be
admitted at trial.").
87. The rationales described below are treated separately for ease of analysis. A vast
majority of the cases, however, do not rely on any one theory but instead apply various rationales
in their attempt to admit or exclude the report. The use of numerous rationales further exemplifies
the lack of clarity regarding the admissibility of laboratory reports under Crawford. Often it
seems as if the courts, unable to find a satisfactory reason for their decision to admit a report,
merely list as many rationales as they can, seemingly saying, "I don't know why I am right, but
one of these reasons must be valid."
88. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004).
89. See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 59 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007) (calibration documents for
breathalyzer machine are nontestimonial; "The Supreme Court did not explicitly define the term
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Some courts go so far as to assert that reports admissible under any
'testimonial' in Crawford, but it did state that business records are, by their nature, not
testimonial."); Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 129 P.3d 471, 475 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (maintenance
and calibration records for Intoxilyzer breath-testing machine are nontestimonial records that fall
within the "clearly delineated exception to Crawford-business records"); Rackoff v. State, 621
S.E.2d 841, 845 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (signed inspection certificate of breath-test machine admitted
pursuant to state statute is nontestimonial; Crawford court indicated "business records by their
nature are not testimonial statements"); People v. Kim, 859 N.E.2d 92, 93 (I11. App. Ct. 2006)
(affidavit of officer who certified Breathalyzer machine is nontestimonial; "Crawford specifically
deemed statements admissible under traditional hearsay exceptions to be nontestimonial ....");
People v. Jambor, 729 N.W.2d 569, 574 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (notation on fingerprint card
written at the scene by nontestifying technician is nontestimonial and admissible as a business
record is nontestimonial under the Crawford Court's observation; "business records are not
testimonial"); State v. Godshalk, 885 A.2d 969, 973 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2005)
(breathalyzer-operator certificate and breathalyzer-machine inspection certificates are
nontestimonial "business records (and official records) of the New Jersey State Police, and thus
are admissible [under state business- and official-record exceptions]"); People v. Grogan, 816
N.Y.S.2d 93 (App. Div. 2006) (DNA report created from complainant's rape kit prepared by
independent laboratory offered though testimony of Office of Chief Medical Examiner criminalist
and private lab director is nontestimonial business records under Crawford); People v. Meekins,
828 N.Y.S.2d 83 (App. Div. 2006) (report created by independent private lab containing DNA test
results of sample from complainant's rape kit, offered through testimony of lab technician and
Medical Examiner's officer forensic biologist, is nontestimonial as business records by their
nature are nontestimonial); People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (autopsy
report created by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner is a business record and admissible
because "[u]nder Crawford business records are specifically exempted from challenge because
they are outside the 'core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to
exclude'") (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63); People v. Kanhai, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Crim. Ct.
2005) (inspection report of breath-test machine is nontestimonial, tracing the history of the New
York business-records exception back to Dutch Colonial courts and finding the New York State
Police Laboratory to qualify as a business, therefore report admissible under the Crawford
reference to business records); People v. Fisher, No. 04-1556, 2005 WL 2780686 (N.Y. City Ct.
Oct. 25, 2005) ("breath test documents" including calibration certificate and certification of
analysis of stimulator solution are nontestimonial and admissible pursuant to state statute without
testimony of preparer, business records are nontestimonial); State v. Windley, 617 S.E.2d 682
(N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (fingerprint card created on defendant's arrest in state computer database is a
nontestimonial business record); State v. Crager, 879 N.E.2d 745, 753 (Ohio 2007) (DNA report is
nontestimonial in part because "business records are, by their nature, not testimonial") (internal
quotation marks omitted); State v. Norman, 125 P.3d 15 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (certificates of
accuracy of Intoxilyzer machine are nontestimonial official records); State v. Warlick, No.
M2005-01477-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 394, at *10 (Crim. App. May 17,
2007) (laboratory results from hospital indicating blood-alcohol level are nontestimonial;
"[B]usiness records are non-testimonial in nature and do not violate the defendant's right of
confrontation."); In re J.R.L.G., No. 11-05-00002-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 3344, at *6 (App.
Apr. 27, 2006) (laboratory report containing results of defendant's urinalysis screen is
nontestimonial because the reports are "more akin to general business records, which the Supreme
Court has characterized as non-testimonial"); Mitchell v. State, 191 S.W.3d 219, 222 (Tex. App.
2005) (autopsy report is nontestimonial and admissible via the testimony of physician from county
medical examiner's office who did not prepare the report, autopsy report is a public or business
record and "business records are nontestimonial"); Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 04-451, 2005
WL 3007781, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 10, 2005) (certificate of analysis from the Virginia
Department of Forensic Science reporting the result of chemical testing is nontestimonial,
admissible as a business record, which the Crawford court "explicitly stated ... was not within its
ruling").
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"traditional" hearsay exception are nontestimonial under Crawford.9"
Thcre are a number of problems with this approach. First, the reference
to business records in Crawford must be to business records as business
records, not to public records as business records for the purported
exception to make any theoretical sense given the underlying concern of
Crawford and Davis, i.e., concern with the behavior of government and
law-enforcement officials. 9 ' In State v. Godshalk, however, the Camden
County Superior Court of New Jersey upheld, over the defendant's Con-
frontation Clause objection in a driving-while-intoxicated prosecution,
the admission of an officer's "breathalyzer operator certificate" as well
as "breathalyzer machine inspection certificates for the Pennsauken
Police Department breathalyzer machine" from before and after the
defendant's arrest.92 The court held that the records were "not within
the 'testimonial evidence' category of Crawford because they are busi-
ness records (and official records) of the New Jersey State Police, and
thus are admissible under [the state exceptions for records of regularly
conducted activity and public records]." 93 In theory, of course, a public
record may at times qualify as a business record. But to give the refer-
ence to business records in Crawford such an expansive definition is
untenable.
This problem sheds light on one of Crawford's severe weaknesses.
On the one hand the case does, whether in dicta or not, say that business
records are nontestimonial. 94 On the other hand, the Court emphatically
states that "[w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do not think
the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the
vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of
90. See Kim, 859 N.E.2d at 93 ("Courts have also recognized that Crawford specifically
deemed statements admissible under traditional hearsay exceptions to be nontestimonial.
(citing Bohsancurt, 129 P.3d at 476, and Rackoff, 621 S.E.2d at 845).
91. See supra Part III.
92. 885 A.2d at 970.
93. Id. at 973; see also N.J. R. EVID. 803(c)(6) ("Records of regularly conducted activity");
id. 803(c)(8) ("Public records, reports, and findings"). Other cases have also held that public
records created by law-enforcement and governmental agencies to be "business records" and thus
nontestimonial under Crawford. E.g., Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863; Kanhai, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870;
Norman, 125 P.3d 15; Mitchell, 191 S.W.3d 219.
94. Admittedly without defining what exactly the Court means by "business record," though,
the context in which the statement was made, as well as Justice Scalia's originalist view of the
Constitution, strongly imply a definition of business records as understood by the Framers. Such
an understanding was that of records admissible at time under the "shop book" exception to the
hearsay rule, a much more limited exception compared to modem day business-records
exceptions. At least one court, however, was lead to the conclusion that the Court was speaking
of "the present day business record exception as codified in Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6)."
Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d at 867. Such a distinction, however, should be immaterial because in the
context of Crawford neither exception would include so-called business records created by
governmental agencies.
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'reliability."' 95 Yet regarding business records as nontestimonial does
exactly this. This is particularly so given the differing standards of state
business-records exceptions. All hearsay exceptions are based on a
belief that a particular type of out-of-court statement is reliable. Thus,
deeming certain exceptions nontestimonial is placing the Confrontation
Clause at the whim of a substantive-reliability standard provided for in
Roberts and shunned by the Court in Crawford. Under Crawford, where
testimonial hearsay is concerned, reliability is to be tested procedurally
by "the crucible of cross-examination,"96 not by an a priori determina-
tion that certain types of records are reliable.
Very importantly, it is not clear how a public record, whether
treated as a business record or not, is to be analyzed under Crawford.
Both Crawford and Davis involve out-of-court statements by witnesses
to law-enforcement officers. Laboratory reports, however, are usually
created within a law-enforcement agency. 97 The intra-law-enforcement
hearsay statements contained in the laboratory report do not fit neatly
within the framework of Crawford and Davis. One can argue that if
statements to police officers by out-of-court witnesses are testimonial
then, a fortiori, statements made by law enforcement in laboratory
reports without an opportunity to cross the preparer must be testimonial
because such statements pose an even greater risk of law-enforcement
misfeasance. One could argue that the report is even more repugnant
than the letter admitted into evidence against Sir Walter Raleigh written
by Lord Cobham (Raleigh's alleged accomplice in treason) 98 in that it is
akin to a letter written by a peace officer stating "Sir Walter Raleigh is a
traitor" offered to prove Raleigh guilty of treason. The logic, however,
does not hold up when faced with the reality that a criminal defendant's
admission to a crime made to a police officer is admissible in evidence
for the truth of the matter asserted. The inconsistency is even more
apparent when one considers that the statement in Crawford found to be
testimonial and inadmissible was recorded. It is clear that simply
because the risk of "flagrant inquisitorial practices"9 9 is greater (the situ-
ation, to put it crudely, is "worse-er") does not necessarily mean that a
95. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004); see also id., 541 U.S. at 51 ("Leaving
the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence would render the Confrontation
Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices.").
96. Id. at 61.
97. Not all reports are created by law enforcement per se. Some are created by governmental
agencies arguably not part of law enforcement and yet others are created by independent
laboratories at the request of law enforcement. The analytical effects of such distinctions are
discussed infra Part IV.C.4. For purposes of this discussion, the author assumes the report is
created by a law-enforcement agency.
98. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
99. Id. at 51.
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statement is testimonial. For if a recorded statement to the police is
testimonial and therefore inadmissible and yet an unrecorded statement
purportedly made by the very person the government is attempting to
prove committed a crime is nontestimonial and admissible through the
testimony of the police officer to whom the statement was allegedly
made, the "worse-er" logic completely fails.' °
It is true that an admission of a party-opponent is defined as not
hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence and many state-evidence
rules. 10 This definition, however, is completely artificial, and there is
no doubt such an admission would fit the definition of hearsay as the
Framers understood the term. The traditional rationale for admitting
admissions of a party opponent is "because he [the party-opponent] him-
self is in that case the only one to invoke the hearsay rule and because he
does not need to cross-examine himself."' 2 But, given the novel under-
lying premise of Crawford that in-court police testimony given under
oath cannot be properly evaluated by a jury,' and given the overarch-
ing fear of abusive governmental tactics, the rationale for admissions of
party opponents being treated as not hearsay and admissible is under-
mined. If the police lie about what a defendant told them, the jury will
likely overvalue the officer's testimony. In such a case, the criminal
defendant would be faced with quite the Hobson's choice: either hope
the jury will not overvalue the officer's testimony (which Crawford
presumes they will) or take the stand and waive his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, which is unlikely to help because the
100. This problem is not unique to laboratory reports admitted as business records. This
logical inconsistency undermines any analysis of laboratory reports whether the court finds such
reports to be testimonial or nontestimonial.
101. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2).
102. 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE § 1048(2), at 4 (James H. Chadboum rev. 1972).
Wigmore further explains:
The theory of the hearsay rule is that an extrajudicial assertion is excluded
unless there has been sufficient opportunity to test the grounds of assertion and the
credit of the witness, by cross-examination by the party against whom it is offered
.... [A party] cannot complain of lack of opportunity to cross-examine himself
before his assertion is admitted against him. Such a request would be absurd.
Hence the objection of the hearsay rule falls away, because the very basis of the rule
is lacking, viz, the need and prudence of affording an opportunity of cross-
examination.
In other words, the hearsay rule is satisfied; [the party] has already had an
opportunity to cross-examine himself or (to put it another way) he now as the
opponent has the full opportunity to put himself on the stand and explain his former
assertion.
Id. at 4-5 (citation omitted). The above statement itself shows that Crawford is untenable when
extended to its logical conclusion. If admissions of party opponents are admissible based on the
hearsay rule under Crawford, they must still past muster under Confrontation Clause analysis,
which as shown in the text above is not a forgone conclusion.
103. See supra Part III.
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jury will still overvalue the officers testimony. Such a choice results in a
de facto stripping of the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights, as all he
can do is take the stand and try to negate the deceitful officer's testi-
mony that is presumed to be overvalued by the jury. Thus, one has two
options when confronted with the logical breakdown of Crawford in the
face of admissions of party-opponents: either admit that admissions of a
party-opponent are testimonial under Crawford and thus inadmissible or
find some necessarily artificial limit to the logic of Crawford in order to
save admissions of party-opponents from Confrontation Clause analysis.
If forced to make such a choice, it is extremely likely that the Supreme
Court will choose the latter. 104 It is also likely that the Crawford major-
ity did not intend to require the preparer of breath-test-machine certifica-
tions to have to testify in every driving-while-intoxicated case like
Godshalk or to give the defendant an opportunity to demand the preparer
of the report to testify."°5 This, however, creates a serious line drawing
problem. In cases where the laboratory report is a central feature, like
with DNA analysis, or where there is a great likelihood of mistake or
fabrication, it seems prudent to require the person who performed the
test to testify. The problem is that Crawford does not lend itself to sub-
tle line drawing-at least if such lines are to retain any semblance of
logical consistency with the rationale of the case. It is easy to see why
many courts faced with the practical implications of Crawford are eager
to take the easy way out of this complex conundrum and find laboratory
reports nontestimonial as business records.
Another problem presented by the business-records language in
Crawford is that, even if business records are treated as purely business
records as opposed to public records, which are also business records,
under what category do reports prepared by private laboratories at the
request of law enforcement fall? The question becomes even more con-
voluted when a private laboratory prepares the report at the request of a
governmental agency that is arguably not part of law enforcement. This,
of course, begs the question: Which governmental agencies are within
the purview of Crawford?
In People v. Meekins, the defendant was charged with and con-
104. See Torres v. Roberts, No. 06-3237-KHV, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41198, at *28 (D. Kan.
June 5, 2007) ("After Crawford, most courts addressing this issue have found that a party's own
admission offered against him can be admitted without the right to cross-examination."); see also
id. (collecting cases).
105. A number of statutes afford the defendant a right to subpoena the preparer of laboratory
reports to be cross-examined as an adverse witness. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, No.
04-451, 2005 WL 3007781 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 10, 2005). An analysis of validity of such
procedures as applied to situations where the report would otherwise be testimonial hearsay and
inadmissible absent unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross under Crawford is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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victed of sodomy and sexual abuse.106 At trial, a report containing the
results of DNA testing conducted on samples from the complainant's
rape kit created by an independent private laboratory was admitted over
the defendant's Confrontation Clause objection. The report was offered
through the testimony of a DNA analysis expert employed by the private
laboratory and a DNA expert employed by the Medical Examiner's
Office of the City of New York. Although the private laboratory expert
supervised the employees who performed the tests, she was not person-
ally involved in the testing. The city employee testified that the report
was "prepared in the regular course of business of the medical exam-
iner's office and its contracted agencies" and that it was "the regular
course of business for the medical examiner's office, as well as its con-
tracted agencies, to make and keep such records."' 17 In finding the
report to have been properly admitted under the New York business-
records exception to the hearsay rule and a purported business-records
exception to the Confrontation Clause, the court held that "[a]lthough
neither [of the above-mentioned witnesses] performed the testing, their
testimony revealed their familiarity with the business practices and pro-
cedures of the private laboratory, and thus they properly set forth a foun-
dation for admission of the records."'' 0 8
Although private laboratories certainly are "businesses" within the
narrow definition of the term presumably intended by the Crawford
majority, their relationship with the government and law enforcement
provides cause for concern. Under the Crawford rationale, not only is
there a fear of influence by the government on the putatively "indepen-
dent" laboratory, there is also a monetary incentive for such private lab-
oratories to acquiesce to governmental and law-enforcement requests.
Given Crawford's fear of governmental, or, at least, of law-enforcement
overreaching, to allow the government to avoid the strictures of Craw-
ford by simply contracting out laboratory testing should not be permit-
ted. Yet on a strictly definitional level, private laboratories are "private"
as opposed to "governmental" and one can reasonably argue that their
106. 828 N.Y.S.2d 83, 84 (App. Div. 2006).
107. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). One should note that the approach of having a
supervisor testify to the reliability of a report was a tactic used under Roberts to admit laboratory
reports in lieu of the preparer's testimony. This was more palatable when the question was not
whether the report was testimonial but rather whether it was reliable. Under Crawford, a court
admitting a laboratory report through supervisor testimony needs first to find the report to be
nontestimonial because if the report is testimonial presumably the testimony of the person who
performed the tests and prepared the report is necessary. See, e.g., People v. Grogan, 816
N.Y.S.2d 93 (App. Div. 2006) (admitting as a business record a laboratory report through
testimony of supervisor).
108. 828 N.Y.S.2d at 84-85 (citations omitted).
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nongovernmental status exempts them from Crawford despite their
working relationship with, and pecuniary connection to, the government.
In People v. Durio, the defendant was convicted of murder."° At
trial, an autopsy report prepared by a medical examiner employed by the
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner was admitted as a business record
through the testimony of another assistant medical examiner. 10 The
defendant moved to vacate the conviction on Confrontation Clause
grounds. Denying the motion, the court held that "[a] public agency
such as the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) constitutes a
'business' for purposes of CPLR 4518." ''  The court noted the lan-
guage in Crawford that business records are nontestimonial. In response
to the lack of a definition in Crawford regarding what constitutes a busi-
ness record, the court found that "[the Court's] use of the phrase, 'by
their nature' leads to the conclusion that the Court was speaking of the
present day business record exception as codified in Federal Rules of
Evidence 803(6). ''11 This approach not only runs counter to Justice
Scalia's originalist outlook but also seems to fly in the face of common-
sense statutory construction. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) applies to
109. 794 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
110. Id. at 865; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4518(a) (Consol. 2005) ("Business records").
111. 794 N.Y.S.2d at 868 (citations omitted).
112. Id. at 867; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(6), which defines "Records of Regularly Conducted
Activity" as:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business
activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown
by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that
complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification,
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph
includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
A number of courts have come to another conclusion regarding the definition of business record as
used in Crawford. These courts find that the business-records reference was to business records
as would be familiar to the Framers. Such records are not akin to modem business records or FED.
R. Evm. 803(6). See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 13 (D.C. 2006) (commenting on
the court business-records reference in Crawford; "[T]his observation about the historical business
records exception does not mean that everything qualifying as a 'business record' now is
automatically non-testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes.... Traditionally, the historical
business records exception did not encompass records prepared for use in litigation, let alone
records produced ex parte by government agents for later use in criminal prosecutions."); State v.
Miller, 144 P.3d 1052, 1058 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (finding a laboratory report testimonial; "[S]uch
a record [would] not fit the common-law exception for business records that would have been
familiar to the framers of the Sixth Amendment."), reconsideration allowed, former opinion
adhered to 149 P.3d 1251 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
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"Public Records and Reports.""' 3 Given the inclusion in the Federal
Rules of Evidence of a rule pertaining solely to Public Records, one
would assume that the drafters intended all records created by public
offices or agencies to be analyzed under the exception pertaining to
them. 114 Crawford states that "[t]he involvement of government officers
113. FED. R. EvID. 803(8), the hearsay exception for "Public Records and Reports," reads:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or
agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to
report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and
against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an
investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
114. This would seem to be the approach that the Rules' drafters intended. But regarding the
approach taken to laboratory reports in Federal courts under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
Professor Michael H. Graham notes that
[a] particular problem arises with respect to forensic laboratory reports. The plain
meaning of the exclusions in Rule 803(8) incorporates such reports, i.e., makes them
inadmissible when offered by the government. However, where the laboratory
technician who personally conducted the tests testifies on personal knowledge,
subject to cross-examination, it seems reasonable to also permit introduction of the
forensic laboratory report itself. A much more difficult situation arises when the
person actually conducting the test is unavailable. A proposal to admit forensic
laboratory reports under such circumstances was made as part of the legislative
process leading up to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence but not
included in the final version. Faced with such circumstances, some courts have
sanctioned admissibility upon the testimony of the supervisor of the unavailable
laboratory technician as an "other qualified witness" pursuant to Rule 803(6).
4 GRAHAM, HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 803.8, at 348 (footnotes omitted). The rejected proposal
to admit laboratory reports was offered by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and would have
been included in the Rules as FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5). It read:
(5) Criminal Law Enforcement Records and Reports.-Records, reports, statements
or data compilations in any form, of police and other law enforcement personnel
where such officer or person is unavailable, as unavailability is defined in subparts
(a) (4) and (a) (5) of this Rule.
S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 4 (1974). This proposal was rejected in a Joint Explanatory Statement of
the Committee of Conference, which reads:
C. Rule 804(b) (5)-Criminal Law Enforcement Records and Reports
The Senate amendment adds a new hearsay exception, not contained in the
House bill, which provides that certain law enforcement records are admissible if
the officer-declarant is unavailable to testify or be present because of (1) death or
physical or mental illness or infirmity or (2) absence from the proceeding and the
proponent of the statement has been unable to procure his attendance by process or
other reasonable means.
The Conference does not adopt the Senate amendment, preferring instead to
leave the bill in the House version, which contained no such provision.
H.R. REP. No. 93-1597, at 12 (1974) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added). This rejection strongly
implies that Congress did not intend to allow "police and other law enforcement personnel"
reports to be admissible under 803(6). Such admission clearly usurps the legislative intent to
require such evidence to be offered through the testimony of the person who prepared such a
record. This, however, begs the question whether reports prepared by "public offices or agencies"
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:839
in the production of testimonial evidence presents the same risk, whether
the officers are police or justices of the peace."'1 15 Whether "govern-
ment officers" in juxtaposition to the latter part of the above-quoted sen-
tence is meant to include governmental agencies such as the medical
examiner's office is less than clear. The Crawford majority, however,
points out that "England did not have a professional police force until
the 19th century, so it is not surprising that other government officers
performed the investigative functions now associated primarily with the
police."' 1 6  It is reasonable to assume that governmental agencies,
including medical examiner's offices, are within the purview of Craw-
ford at least to the extent they perform "investigative functions" such as
determining cause of death.' 17 Despite the Durio court's assertion that
the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner is "not a law enforcement
agency and is 'by law, independent of and not subject to the control of
the office of the prosecutor,'"118 such a distinction would not have been
made in seventeenth-century England.
The government is the government. Under Crawford, the citizenry
must be protected from its "flagrant inquisitorial practices." That "by
law" an agency is independent does not mean that it is not susceptible to
committing abuse on its own accord or in aid of fellow governmental
agencies.
(as opposed to "police and other law enforcement personnel") and inadmissible under 803(8)(B)
and (C) were intended to be treated similarly. Given the clear distinction between "Records of
Regularly Conducted Activity" and "Public records and Reports" it is very reasonable to assume
that if a report is inadmissible under 803(8) (B) or (C) the government should not be able to use
803(6) as a back door to admissibility.
115. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004).
116. Id. (citation omitted).
117. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, such "factual findings" should be analyzed
according to the principles of FED. R. EVID. 803(8) (B) and (C), not FED. R. EVID. 803(9), which
provides a hearsay exception for "Records of Vital Statistics." See 4 GRAHAM, HANDBOOK, supra
note 8, § 803.9, at 378. Additionally, Professor Graham has noted:
Justice Scalia in Crawford thus sought to formulate a theoretical construct of the
Confrontation Clause that at a minimum encompasses its primary objective of
barring the admissibility of formal statements arising from ex parte judicial
examination or police interrogation of witnesses initiated by government officials in
anticipation or in aid of potential criminal litigation whenever the out-of-court
declarant of such statement fails to testify at the criminal trail subject to cross-
examination.
Graham, Special Report, supra note 4, at 74 (empahsis added) (footnote omitted).
118. People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 868 (Sup. Ct. 2005); see also People v. Brown, 801
N.Y.S.2d 709, 711 (Sup. Ct. 2005) ("The notes and records of the laboratory technicians who
tested the DNA samples ... were not made for investigative or prosecutorial purposes but rather
were made for the routine purpose of ensuring the accuracy of the testing done in the laboratory
and as a foundation for formulating the DNA profile.").
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2. THE ABOVE-QUOTED BUSINESS-RECORDS REFERENCE IN CRAWFORD
IS DICTUM
When faced with the question whether a laboratory report is testi-
monial, a number of courts have determined that the reference to busi-
ness records in Crawford is dictum and yet admit the report as a
nontestimonial business record." 9 These courts necessarily tend to rely
more heavily on other justifications for finding a report to be nontesti-
monial than courts finding the Crawford reference to be a holding. That
the report is deemed a business record is often used to bolster other
arguments that laboratory reports are nontestimonial. Yet when a court
relies on the business-records reference, even as dictum, it runs into the
same problems described in Part 1.12°
In Rollins v. State, the defendant was convicted of murder. 2 ' The
medical examiner who performed an autopsy on the victim and prepared
a report was unavailable. The report was admitted through the testi-
mony of another deputy medical examiner with the Office of the Chief
119. See Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 835 (Md. 2006) (autopsy report redacted to contain
only routine, descriptive, and not analytical hearsay is nontestimonial; "[T]he Supreme Court
indicated in Crawford that the hearsay exceptions, such as the business records exception, can
exempt evidence from scrutiny under the Confrontation Clause."); Commonwealth v. Verde, 827
N.E.2d 701, 705 (Mass. 2005) (lab technician drug-analysis report is nontestimonial; "[Crawford]
suggest[s] in dictum that ... business or official record[s] would not be subject to its holding as
this exception was well established in 1791. . . . One acknowledged exception to the
confrontation clause is a public record, 'an ancient principle of the common law, recognized at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution."'); State v. Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137, 143 (N.C. 2006) (State
Bureau of Investigation DNA Report is nontestimonial; "[T]he Supreme Court in Crawford
indicated in dicta that business records are not testimonial."); State v. Cao, 626 S.E.2d 301, 304
(N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (laboratory report indicating that substance is crack is nontestimonial though
some such reports may be testimonial; "Crawford suggests that business records 'by their nature'
may not be testimonial."); Vill. of Granville v. Eastman, No. 2006CA00050, 2006 Ohio App.
LEXIS 6213, at *9-11 (Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2006) (packet of documents containing certification
breath-test machine working properly and officer certification to perform test documents, at least
according to dicta in Crawford business records are nontestimonial); State v. Greene, No.
CA2005-12-129, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6053, at *7 (Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2006) (Ohio Department
of Health senior operator's certificate and solution-batch certificate for breath-test machine are
nontestimonial; "The U.S. Supreme Court stated, in dicta, that business records are not
testimonial."); State v. Cook, No. WD-04-029, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 1514, at *9 (Ct. App. Mar.
13, 2005) (packet of documents containing certification breath-test machine working properly and
officer certification to perform test; "[W]e conclude that the records are business records, which,
at least according to dicta in Crawford, are not testimonial."); State v. Thackaberry, 95 P.3d 1142,
1145 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (toxicologist report signed by Department of State Police is likely to be
considered admissible because "Crawford suggested in dictum [business and official records]
would not be subject to its holding" and under plain-error analysis it is up to reasonable dispute
whether admission of the report was error); see also Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 870
N.E.2d 676 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. Mar. 17, 2008) (No. 07-
591).
120. See supra Part I.
121. 897 A.2d at 823.
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Medical Examiner. In a painstaking thirty-two-page opinion, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland found that the report, as redacted, was nontesti-
monial and properly admitted under the Maryland business- 122 and
public- 123 records exceptions. The report was redacted so as not to
include any "contested opinions, speculations, and conclusions drawn
from the objective findings."1 24 Because of this redaction of "opinion
statements," the court rejected the petitioner's contention that "an
autopsy report is per se testimonial"'' 25 and held that,
[i]f the autopsy report contains only findings about the physical con-
dition of the decedent that may be fairly characterized as routine,
descriptive and not analytical, and those findings are generally relia-
ble and are afforded an indicum of reliability, the report may be
admitted into evidence without the testimony of its preparer, and
without violating the Confrontation Clause. If the autopsy report
contains statements which can be categorized as contested opinions
or conclusions, or are central to the determination of the defendant's
guilt, they are testimonial and trigger the protections of the Confron-
tation Clause, requiring both the unavailability of the witness and
prior opportunity for cross-examination.126
Not only does this decision base a finding of whether a statement is
testimonial on a court-made determination of reliability, an approach
expressly rejected in Crawford,'2 7 it also leaves the Confrontation
Clause to the "vagaries of the rules of evidence." ' Assuming, argu-
endo, that a medical examiner's office is capable of producing testimo-
nial statements, 129 under the court's rationale, certain statements, if they
122. Id. at 837; see also MD. R. EVID. 5-803(b)(6) ("Records of Regularly Conducted Business
Activity").
123. 897 A.2d at 837-38; see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 10-611(g)(1) (West 2007)
("Public record"). Public records are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under MD. R.
EVID. 5-803(b)(8) ("Public Records and Reports").
124. 897 A.2d at 834.
125. Id. at 844.
126. Id. at 845-46.
127. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (one of the vices of the Roberts
approach is that it "allows a jury to hear evidence ... based on a mere judicial determination of
reliability").
128. The Rollins court expressly referenced this language in Crawford. 897 A.2d at 829.
129. This argument is not far fetched given a medical examiner's responsibilities under
Maryland law:
(a)(1) A medical examiner shall investigate the death of a human being if the death
occurs:
(i) By violence;
(ii) By suicide;
(iii) By casualty;
(iv) Suddenly, if the deceased was in apparent good health or unattended by a
physician; or
(v) In any suspicious or unusual manner.
(Vol. 62:839
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meet the strictures of the business- or public-records exceptions, will be
nontestimonial. Other statements collected or created by the medical
examiner or similar governmental entities may be testimonial simply
because they do not fit within such exceptions. For example, if a medi-
cal examiner while performing an autopsy made a so-called "objective"
present-sense impression 130 utterance to a fellow examiner, such a state-
ment would be inadmissible because it does not fit the Crawford dictum
referring to business records. Yet the same statement, when put in a
report constituting a business or public record under the Maryland rules
of evidence, would be admissible simply because it fits within certain
hearsay exceptions which are arbitrarily deemed nontestimonial. As a
result, the Confrontation Clause is left not only to the "vagaries of the
rules of evidence" but to certain rules of evidence and not others, with-
out any apparent rationale. Additionally, there is no basis in Crawford
or Davis for differentiating between "objective" and "opinion"
statements.
To the Rollins court's credit, there is no logical way to analyze
autopsy reports under Crawford. If the Office of the Chief Medical
Examiner is a part of the government subject to Crawford analysis, then
under the "worse-er" rationale the report should be inadmissible in lieu
of unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross the preparing examiner.
But the "worse-er" rationale does not pass logical muster when faced
with the admissibility of an admission of a party-opponent made by the
criminal defendant to a police officer. Avoiding this difficulty, other
courts argue that laboratories such as medical examiner's offices are, in
fact, not part of the "government" as contemplated in Crawford. The
merits of this argument are discussed infra.'
Some state courts find that laboratory reports are, or arguably may
be, business records, yet after further analysis they determine the report
in question to be testimonial under Crawford.132 The analysis of these
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-309 (West 2007) (emphasis added).
130. Present-sense impressions are an exception to the hearsay rule. FED. R. EvID. 803(1).
131. See discussion infra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
132. See State v. Moss, 160 P.3d 1143, 1149-50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (blood test prepared by
nontestifying criminalist from private laboratory on which expert based testimony is testimonial;
"The Supreme Court suggested in dicta in Crawford that business records are non-testimonial. ...
[H]owever, the application of the Confrontation Clause is not controlled by state evidence law."),
review denied, opinion depublished, 173 P.3d 1021 (Ariz. 2007); Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169
P.3d 662, 666 (Colo. 2007) (laboratory report is testimonial; "Crawford's dictum regarding the
historic business records hearsay exception does not mean that any document which falls within
the modem-day business records exception is automatically nontestimonial."); Belvin v. State,
922 So. 2d 1046, 1051 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (breath-test affidavit created by technician
who administered breath test is testimonial; "[S]tatutory listing of breath test affidavits under the
public records and reports exception to the hearsay rule does not control whether they are
testimonial under Crawford."); id. at 1054 (certifying question: "Does admission of those portions
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courts goes beyond whether a laboratory report is a business or public
record and looks to other factors that lead them to deem the report testi-
monial. Making such a decision, however, often does not sit well with
these courts. After finding reports to be testimonial, lower state courts
in Florida and Ohio requested that their respective highest courts review
questions regarding whether, in fact, the reports are testimonial.'33 This
of the breath test affidavit pertaining to the breath test operator's procedures and observations in
administering the breath test constitute testimonial evidence and violate the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause in light of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Crawford v.
Washington?") (citation omitted), certifying question to 928 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 2006); Johnson v.
State, 929 So. 2d 4, 8-9 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (laboratory report created by the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement is testimonial; "The business records exception may have been
the vehicle for admitting the report, but the vehicle does not determine the nature of the out-of-
court statement. . . . The out-of-court statement does not lose its testimonial nature merely
because it is contained in a business record.") (certifying question: "Does the admission of a
Florida Department of Law Enforcement lab report establishing the illegal nature of substances
possessed by the defendant violate the Confrontation Clause and Crawford v. Washington, when
the person who performed the lab test did not testify?") (citation omitted), certifying question to
924 So. 2d. 810 (Fla. 2006); State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 665 (Mo. 2007) (laboratory report is
testimonial; noting that the business-records exception referred to in Crawford was the narrow
exception in existence at the time of the Founding and finding that cases deeming business records
to be per se nontestimonial "incorrectly focus on the reliability of such reports"); People v. Orpin,
796 N.Y.S.2d 512, 516 (Just. Ct. 2005) (inspection, maintenance, and calibration records of
breath-test machine prepared by state division of criminal justice and certification of analysis of
stimulator solution prepared by state-police forensic investigation center are testimonial;
"[B]usiness records are subject to the same confrontation demands as other out-of-court
statements."), rev'd sub. nom. Green v. DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d 722 (Sup. Ct. 2005); People v.
Hemandez, 794 N.Y.S.2d 788, 789 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (latent fingerprint card is testimonial; "[T]he
People's contention that the Supreme Court would sanction the admission into evidence of the
Latent Print Report because it is a business record ignores the inconvenient fact that under Rule
803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence the report would not be admitted in federal trials .... ").
133. See Belvin v. State, 922 So. 2d 1046, 1051 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (breath-test
affidavit created by technician who administered breath test is testimonial; "[S]tatutory listing of
breath test affidavits under the public records and reports exception to the hearsay rule does not
control whether they are testimonial under Crawford."); id. at 1054 (certifying question: "Does
admission of those portions of the breath test affidavit pertaining to the breath test operator's
procedures and observations in administering the breath test constitute testimonial evidence and
violate the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause in light of the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Crawford v. Washington?") (citation omitted), certifying question to 928 So. 2d
336 (Fla. 2006); Johnson v. State, 929 So. 2d 4, 8-9 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (laboratory
report created by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement is testimonial; "The business
records exception may have been the vehicle for admitting the report, but the vehicle does not
determine the nature of the out-of-court statement.... The out-of-court statement does not lose
its testimonial nature merely because it is contained in a business record.") (certifying question:
"Does the admission of a Florida Department of Law Enforcement lab report establishing the
illegal nature of substances possessed by the defendant violate the Confrontation Clause and
Crawford v. Washington, when the person who performed the lab test did not testify?") (citation
omitted), certifying question to 924 So. 2d. 810 (Fla. 2006); State v. Crager, 844 N.E.2d 390,
397-99 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (DNA test report is testimonial), certifying question to 846 N.E.2d
532 (Ohio 2006) (court determines conflict exists, ordering parties to brief issue: "Are records of
scientific tests, conducted by a government agency at the request of the State for the specific
purpose of being used as evidence in the criminal prosecution of a specific individual,
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discomfort is presumably generated by what the courts correctly per-
ceive to be a lack of a sufficient answer provided by Crawford and
Davis, as well as the practical ramifications of the inadmissibility of the
reports.
B. Reliability of the Laboratory Report
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court based its Confrontation Clause analy-
sis of the admissibility of hearsay in a criminal trial on whether the state-
ment contained "indicia of reliability" or "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." '134 But in rejecting Roberts,'35 the Supreme Court
stated that the Framers did not intend to leave the Sixth Amendment's
protections "to amorphous notions of 'reliability.' "136 Instead the ulti-
mate goal of the Clause "is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular man-
ner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination."'37 Nothing in
Davis undermined this holding. In fact, Davis made it clear that even
when an excited utterance138 is made to law enforcement and the entire
intercourse with the declarant recorded, the statement is testimonial if
"the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."'' 39 The under-
lying premise of Crawford and Davis is that, when there is governmen-
tal involvement, a statement is presumed unreliable and therefore the
declarant must be subjected to cross-examination. In spite of this, how-
ever, many courts still look to reliability in determining whether a labo-
ratory report is testimonial.
1. LABORATORY REPORTS ARE ROUTINE AND THEREFORE
NONTESTIMONIAL; WHETHER A REPORT IS ROUTINE IS NOT A
PROPER INQUIRY UNDER CRAWFORD
Some courts rely on the fact that laboratory reports are routine in
'testimonial' under Crawford v. Washington?") (citation omitted), overruled by 879 N.E.2d 745
(Ohio 2007).
134. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
135. For "testimonial hearsay" in Crawford and outright in Davis.
136. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). The court also emphatically states that
"[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with
jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment
prescribes." Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
138. Excited utterances are presumed reliable under the rules of evidence, and they are not
excluded by the hearsay rule. FED. R. EvID. 803(2).
139. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
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deeming them reliable and therefore nontestimonial.140 Assuming, argu-
endo, that reports created by governmental agencies are capable of being
testimonial, the routine character of their preparation is wholly irrelevant
under Crawford. As shown above, it is clear that whether a statement is
substantively regarded as routine and thus reliable is irrelevant to any
analysis under Crawford. The declarant must be cross-examined and
thus a jury must deem the statement reliable following a specific proce-
dural insurance of reliability: cross-examination.
In State v. Lackey, an autopsy report was admitted through the testi-
mony of a coroner who did not prepare the report because the preparing
physician was deceased.14 ' The report was admitted at trial under a
Kansas hearsay exception called "Contemporaneous statements and
statements admissible on ground of necessity generally."' 141 On appeal,
the defendant challenged the admissibility of the report under the Con-
frontation Clause. The court found that "[s]ince a copy of the autopsy
140. See People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 140 (Cal. 2007) (DNA report created on state request
by private laboratory is nontestimonial; "[The nontestifying technician's report] w[as] made
during a routine, non-adversarial process meant to ensure accurate analysis .... ") (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); People v. Moline, No. D049262, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 9933, at *25-26 (Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2007) (laboratory report is nontestimonial; "[A]
laboratory analyst recording test data during a routine, non-adversarial process meant to ensure
accurate analysis was not bear[ing] witness against the defendant within the meaning of the
Crawford rule.") (second alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); In
re D.H., No. Al 16095, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8214, at *11 (Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2007)
(laboratory report is nontestimonial; "[S]uch analyses are generated as part of a standardized
scientific protocol; are conducted pursuant to the analyst's profession and during a routine,
nonadversarial process meant to ensure accurate analysis .... "); Jarrell v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1022,
1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (certificate created by State Department of toxicology stating breath-
test machine has been inspected and certified is nontestimonial; "[T]he certificates serve an
administrative function and are prepared in a routine manner."); State v. Lackey, 120 P.3d 332,
351 (Kan. 2005) (autopsy report is nontestimonial; "[Alutopsy reports generally make routine and
descriptive observations of the physical body in an environment where the medical examiner
would have little incentive to fabricate the results."), overruled by State v. Davis, 158 P.3d 317
(Kan. 2006); State v. Anderson, 942 So. 2d 625, 629 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (autopsy report is
nontestimonial; "The information in the autopsy report was routine, descriptive, and
nonanalytical; i.e., it was nontestimonial in nature .... ); Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 845-46
(Md. 2006) (autopsy report as redacted is nontestimonial; "If the autopsy report contains only
findings about the physical condition of the decedent that may be fairly characterized as routine,
descriptive and not analytical, and those findings are generally reliable and are afforded an
indicum of reliability, the report may be admitted into evidence without the testimony of its
preparer, and without violating the Confrontation Clause."); Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 04-
451, 2005 WL 3007781, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 10, 2005) (certificate of analysis from Virginia
Department of Forensic Science is nontestimonial; "The legislature of Virginia, in enacting [a
state statute allowing admissibility of such certificates and providing the defendant a right to
summon the technician] recognized that certificates of analysis present the same qualifications of
routine and reliability that support documentary evidence entered under the business records
exception.").
141. 120 P.3d at 345-46.
142. Id. at 343; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(d) (West 2006) ("Contemporaneous
statements and statements admissible on ground of necessity generally.").
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report was required to be filed with the clerk of the district court ... it
follows that the autopsy report would also qualify as a copy of an offi-
cial record."' 43 In light of the practical ramifications of a per se rule
requiring the preparing coroner to testify, the court found the report to
be nontestimonial in part because autopsy reports "generally make rou-
tine and descriptive observations of the physical body."'" Under the
court's "approach, factual, routine, descriptive, and nonanalytical find-
ings made in an autopsy report are nontestimonial and may be admitted
without the testimony of the medical examiner." '45 Such routine find-
ings were contrasted with "contested opinions, speculations, and conclu-
sions" that the court deemed testimonial.1 46 Not only is this approach
wrong in that it bases the testimonial-nontestimonial analysis on relia-
bility, but it leaves the court broad discretion to make ad hoc determina-
tions of "routine-ness" and thus is a "malleable standard [that] often fails
to protect against paradigmatic confrontation violations." '147
Other courts, however, recognize that being routine or reliable is
not a factor to consider under Crawford.14 8 Assuming intragovernmen-
tal statements are subject to analysis under Crawford, these courts cor-
rectly state that reliability is not a factor to be considered. This being
the case, all intragovernmental statements will be testimonial, something
that courts relying on reliability as a factor quite reasonably want to
avoid.
143. 120 P.3d at 348; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(o) (West 2006) ("Content of official
record").
144. 120 P.3d at 351 (emphasis added).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004). It should be noted that the discretion
permitted under Roberts is far from completely eliminated under Crawford. One needs to look no
further than to Davis and the necessity a court has to determine whether the primary purpose of an
interrogation is "to meet an ongoing emergency" or to "establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution." Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). Simply
because this determination is to be made from circumstances "objectively" viewed does not
change the fact the differentiating between the two paradigmatic situations will often be far from
clear.
148. See Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 15 (D.C. 2006) (chemists written statement is
testimonial; "Reliability no longer shields testimony from confrontation."); State v. Caulfield, 722
N.W.2d 304, 309 (Minn. 2006) (laboratory report created by the Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension found to be testimonial; "The state refers us to cases from other states that . . . hold
that lab reports are not testimonial .... [T]hese cases seem to wrongly focus on the reliability of
such reports."); State v. Smith, No. 1-05-39, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 1555, at *13 (Ct. App. Apr.
3, 2006) (finding a laboratory report to be testimonial; "[T]he Supreme Court in Crawford
specifically rejected any notion that the reliability of the statement had any bearing on whether the
statement could be considered 'testimonial.' ").
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2. SCIENTIFIC, MECHANICAL, AND THE LIKE MAKE LABORATORY
REPORTS NONTESTIMONIAL
Some courts rely on the scientific or mechanical nature of labora-
tory reports in finding them to be nontestimonial.' 49 This approach is no
different from asserting that the report is reliable and therefore nontesti-
monial; it simply specifies the form of reliability. Yet the pressure to
admit laboratory reports without the preparer's testimony often causes
courts to make what seem to be blatantly contradictory statements to
prevent technicians from being called every time a laboratory report is
offered into evidence.
In Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, the state appealed from a lower-court
decision finding that "maintenance and calibration records for an Intox-
ilyzer 5000 breath-testing machine are testimonial."' 5 At the outset of
the opinion, the Arizona Court of Appeals, in reference to Crawford,
stated that "[t]he Court adopted an absolute rule when 'testimonial' evi-
dence of a witness who does not appear at trial is involved-regardless
of reliability, the evidence is inadmissible unless the declarant is
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
him or her."'' Yet a mere two pages later, the court found the records
to be nontestimonial and admissible as a business record partly because
"the maintenance records contain factual memorializations generated by
149. See Pruitt v. State, 954 So. 2d 611, 617 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (certificate of analysis of
substance found on defendant is nontestimonial; "[A] certificate of analysis is not based on
speculation, opinion, or guesswork, but instead is founded in scientific testing to determine the
physical and chemical composition of the substance and the amount or quantity of the
substance."); Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 129 P.3d 471, 476 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (maintenance and
calibration records for a breath-test machine are nontestimonial; "[T]he maintenance records
contain factual memorializations generated by a scientific machine."); Commonwealth v. Verde,
827 N.E.2d 701, 705 (Mass. 2005) (certificates of chemical analysis are nontestimonial; "[Tihey
merely state the results of a well-recognized scientific test determining the composition and
quantity of the substance."); Green v. DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d 772, 781-82 (Sup. Ct. 2005)
(certification of calibration of breath-test machine is nontestimonial; "When a technician certifies
the accuracy of a breath testing instrument, he is acting no differently than an auto mechanic when
he affixes an inspection sticker on a car."); State v. Cao, 626 S.E.2d 301, 305 (N.C. Ct. App.
2006) (laboratory report showing substance contains cocaine may be nontestimonial;
"[L]aboratory reports' specification of the weight of the substances at issue would likely qualify
as an objective fact obtained through a mechanical means."); State v. Norman, 125 P.3d 15, 18
(Or. Ct. App. 2005) (documents certifying breath-test machine had been tested for accuracy are
nontestimonial; "[C]ertifications in this case do not resemble the classic kind of testimonial
evidence at which the Confrontation Clause was aimed .... [T]he certifications are evidence
about the accuracy of a test result arrived at by a machine."); Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 3082-
05-1, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 152, at *10 (Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2006) (report of Sexual Assault Nurse
Examiner is nontestimonial; "The report is the result of a physical examination of the victim
....1').
150. 129 P.3d at 472.
151. Id. at 474.
[Vol. 62:839
2008]LABORATORY REPORTS UNDER CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 869
a scientific machine."' 5 2 So what happened in two pages? It is likely
that the court realized that if the prosecution was required to call the
technician who performed the maintenance and calibration of the
machine in every driving-while-intoxicated case, the burden on the crim-
inal-justice system would be insufferable. Such a concern is certainly
justified. 53 Yet if Crawford is extended to its logical conclusion, call-
ing the technician would be required. It is clear, however, that the court
by its own admission erred in using reliability as a rationale for finding
the records to be nontestimonial. Regardless of whether the record con-
sisted simply of a technician writing down the results of a mechanical
test, the fact that the government hearsay declarant is a mere scrivener is
of no moment under an honest application of Crawford.'54
3. LABORATORY REPORTS: OBJECTIVE VS. SUBJECTIVE
A number of courts rely on a distinction between objective and sub-
jective laboratory reports (and statements therein), deeming the former
nontestimonial and the latter testimonial.'55 In People v. Salinas, the
152. Id. at 476.
153. There are other types of laboratory reports where the concern for the system is
outweighed by other concerns such as risk of error, fraud, or mistake and it seems appropriate that
the defendant be given the opportunity to cross-examine the person who performed the tests.
Crawford, however, creates an all or nothing situation-if some laboratory reports are testimonial,
all laboratory reports should be. Nothing in Crawford provides for a means to differentiate
between reports created by the government that intuitively seem not to necessitate cross-
examination and those that do.
154. In addition to the error in using a reliability analysis under Crawford, laboratory testing,
though scientific, is not immune to mistake or fraud. See Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 15
(D.C. 2006) ("[Llaboratories are not immune from problems of dishonesty, sloppiness, poor
training, bias, unsound methodology, and scientific or other error."); see also Andre A.
Moenssens, Forward: Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some Words of Caution, 84 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1993); Flynn McRoberts & Steve Mills, U.S. Seeks Review of
Fingerprint Techniques; High-profile Errors Prompt Questions, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 21, 2005, at 1;
Leslie A. Pappas, Crime Lab Follows Strict Rules, But Scientists Can Make Errors, PHIL. INQ.,
July 18, 2003, at B4; Ruth Teichroeb, State Patrol Fires Crime Lab Scientist; His Testimony in
Montana Cited; Internal Audit Is Downplayed, SEArLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 24, 2004, at
BI.
155. See Pruitt v. State, 954 So. 2d 611, 617 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (finding a certificate of
analysis nontestimonial because "certificates of analysis prepared by the Alabama Department of
Forensic Sciences are business records grounded in inherently trustworthy and reliable scientific
testing, rather than opinionated assertions"); People v. Salinas, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 302, 306 (Ct. App.
2007) (laboratory report showing substance to be methamphetamine is nontestimonial; "The
report was not opinion evidence."); State v. Lackey, 120 P.3d 332, 351 (Kan. 2005) (autopsy
report is nontestimonial; "The court . . . differentiat[es] between objective factual findings
(nontestimonial) and opinions and conclusions regarding cause of death (testimonial) ...."),
overruled by State v. Davis, 158 P.3d 317 (Kan. 2006); Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 841 (Md.
2006) (autopsy report is nontestimonial once "redacted to omit any information that could be
construed as an 'opinion"'); Costley v. State, 926 A.2d 769, 788 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) ("If
the autopsy report caintains statements which can be categorized as contested opinions or
conclusions, or are central to the determination of the defendant's guilt, they are testimonial
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defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine. 15 6 At trial,
a laboratory report prepared by a retired criminologist while he was
employed at the Kern County Regional Crime Laboratory was admitted
into evidence. The report established that the substance found on the
defendant was methamphetamine. The retired criminologist did not tes-
tify. Instead, a supervisor of the retired criminologist laid a foundation
for the report and it was admitted as a public record.'57 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals of California found admission of the report not to vio-
late the Confrontation Clause. In deeming the report nontestimonial, the
court relied largely on the fact that the report was "not opinion evi-
dence"' 58 and that the report was "admitted only to show recorded test
results."' 59 The court further noted that the trustworthiness requirement
of the public-records exception to the hearsay rule is "established by a
showing that the written report is based upon the observations of public
employees who have a duty to observe the facts and report and record
.... "); People v. Jambor, 729 N.W.2d 569, 575 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (fingerprint cards with
technicians writing is nontestimonial; "[T]he fingerprint cards . . . contained no subjective
statements .... ); People v. Freycinet, 839 N.Y.S.2d 770, 770 (App. Div. 2007) ("The trial court
properly determined that the non-opinion portion of the autopsy report was nontestimonial in
nature .... "); People v. Hrubecky, No. 2006RI005491, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3859, at *5
(Crim. Ct. Dec. 13, 2006) (test ampules, certified copies of stimulator-solution certification, and
maintenance records of a breath-test instrument are nontestimonial; "[The reports are] neutral in
character, relating only to the operation of the breath test instrument and the reference solution
used to calibrate it-thus the results were neither discretionary nor based upon opinion."); People
v. Lebrecht, 823 N.Y.S.2d 824, 828 (App. Term 2006) (breath-test machine certifications are
nontestimonial; "[They] involve merely the application of an objective procedure which does not
involve the exercise of judgment and discretion, expressions of opinion, and making
conclusions.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Green v. DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d 772, 784
(Sup. Ct. 2005) (certifications of breath-test machine and solution are nontestimonial; "These
matters [involving certification] are neither discretionary nor based upon opinion."); People v.
Brown, 801 N.Y.S.2d 709, 712 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (DNA profile reports from independent laboratory
and medical examiner's office are nontestimonial; "[T]he records of the DNA testing ... do not
contain opinions of a testimonial nature, the records are simply memorializations of tests that were
conducted.") (internal quotation marks omitted); People v. Mellott, No. 1173-05, 2005 WL
3322843, at *4 (N.Y. Just. Ct. Dec. 7, 2005) ("breath test foundation documents" are
nontestimonial in part because the documents "purport to record the results of an objective test or
process"); State v. Sims, No. 89261, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 5968, at *5 (Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2007)
(holding that "the ballistic test was nontestimonial because the conclusions stated in the report
were fact, not opinion"); In re J.R.L.G., No. 11-05-00002-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 3344, at *4
(App. Apr. 27, 2006) (laboratory report containing the result of a drug test is nontestimonial;
"Where records are involved, courts have distinguished between objective or historical
information and subjective observations germane to the accused."); Anderson v. Commonwealth,
634 S.E.2d 372, 377 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (certificate of analysis of rape kit offered under statue as
prima facie evidence of chain of custody is nontestimonial; "Crawford ... did not extend the
Sixth Amendment to 'documents establishing the existence or absence of some objective fact
.... ), affd, 650 S.E.2d 702 (Va. 2007).
156. 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 303.
157. Id. at 304.
158. Id. at 306.
159. Id. at 305.
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them correctly."'
That a statement is "objective" has no bearing on whether it is testi-
monial. Objectivity is merely a form of reliability. One can reasonably
argue that a laboratory report offered by a government official at trial is
no different analytically from a statement by a nongovernment witness
to a government official. In fact, given the premise of Crawford and
Davis that it is the governmental involvement that creates a risk of "fla-
grant inquisitorial practices," the only analytical difference is that there
is more cause for concern in the laboratory-report context.16 1 For exam-
ple, if a victim of domestic abuse were to call 911 after her assailant left
the premises and said "I was punched in the face and have a black eye,"
this statement would be testimonial under Crawford and Davis because
it was made to the police and because the circumstances, viewed objec-
tively, indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to estab-
lish or prove past events "potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution."' 161 This is so even if the entire discourse is recorded. Such
a statement is certainly not an opinion; it is an objective statement of
fact. The statement in a laboratory report, "A test performed on the
substance revealed it to be methamphetamine," is no different.
The Salinas court's argument that the report prepared by a govern-
ment official is more trustworthy because of the government's duty to
"observe facts and report and record them correctly" is in complete con-
trast to the premise of Crawford that governmental involvement creates
a greater risk of abuse. Further, it is not the statement of the witness that
is to be analyzed under Crawford but whether, viewed objectively, the
primary purpose the government is to "establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution." Whether the declar-
ant's statement is objective or subjective is of no moment. In Salinas,
the declarant (the retired criminologist) made a hearsay statement (the
substance was drugs), which was offered by the supervisor without an
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 63 Crawford postulates that
a jury is incapable of evaluating a government official's in-court testi-
mony regarding an out-of-court statement. Salinas is just such a situa-
160. Id. (quoting People v. Parker, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 41 (Ct. App. 1992)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
161. This of course returns us to the "worse-er" situation described supra Part IV.A. 1.
162. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
163. The Salinas Court also argued that even if Crawford applies "routine documentary
evidence" given that it is "highly unlikely" that the retired criminologist "who actually ran the
test, would have testified any differently" the testimony of the supervisor would satisfy the
Confrontation Clause. 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 306. This argument was often employed under Roberts,
but it is clearly no longer valid under Crawford.
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tion, and that the out-of-court statement is objective does not change the
analysis.
4. CROSS-EXAMINING THE PREPARER OF THE LABORATORY REPORT
WOULD BE OF LITTLE OR NO VALUE
Like Roberts, some courts rely on assertions that cross-examining
the person who performed the tests would be of little value in response
to the question whether a laboratory report is admissible under the Con-
frontation Clause in lieu of the preparer's in-court testimony. 164  In
Napier v. State, the lower court admitted a "Director of Toxicology's
certificate, which stated that an inspection and tests were performed on
the [breath-test] machine on a specified date, and that 'the instrument is
in good operating condition satisfying the accuracy requirements set out
by the State Department of Toxicology Regulations.' 1 65 The certificate
further specified that the original Letter of Certification was on file with
the Clerk of the Circuit Court, as mandated. Neither the Director of
Toxicology nor the inspector of the machine testified. In finding the
certificate to be nontestimonial, the Court of Appeals of Indiana stated,
"we do not see how the admission of these certificates would serve to
preclude any meaningful cross-examination of the breath test evidence
presented against [the defendant]." '166 If Crawford applies, then this
approach is improper on two levels. That cross-examination would not
be meaningful is either an assertion of reliability of the report or an
164. See, e.g., id. ("It is highly unlikely that... the criminalist who actually ran the test, would
have testified any differently. [The criminalist who ran the test] would most likely have been
required to rely upon the document itself to recount the test results; it is highly unlikely that he
would have an independent recollection of the test performed on this particular sample."); Napier
v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (breath-test machine certification documents
are nontestimonial; "[W]e do not see how the admission of these certificates would serve to
preclude any meaningful cross-examination of the breath test evidence presented against [the
defendant]."); Notti v. State, No. DV-05-89, 2005 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1713, at *6 (Dist. Ct. Dec.
9, 2005) (DNA report nontestimonial where the tester's co-worker laid the foundation; "The
cross-examination of [the co-worker] was the same as the cross-examination of [the tester] would
have been had [the tester] testified."); State v. O'Maley, 932 A.2d 1, 13 (N.H. 2007) (blood-
sample-collection form including information about the technician drawing the blood and the
draw itself is nontestimonial; "If the technician had been called to testify at trial ... she likely
'would be unable to recall from actual memory information related to [its] specific contents and
would rely instead upon the record of . . . her own action.' ") (alterations in original); State v.
Crager, 879 N.E.2d 745, 758 (Ohio 2007) (DNA report is nontestimonial; "[I]f Duvall, who
actually did the DNA testing, had testified instead of [the testifying expert], her responses to
defense counsel's questions likely would have been very similar, if not identical, to [the testifying
expert's]. There are no indications that Crager was not able to conduct a meaningful cross-
examination .... ").
165. 820 N.E.2d at 149. Note that this certificate is not only hearsay, but double-level hearsay
(the tester made an out-of-court statement to the director who made an out-of-court statement that
was offered in court).
166. Id.
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assertion that, even if the report is unreliable, cross-examination would
be of no assistance. The former, as stated earlier, is wrong. The latter is
an indictment of the very process that the Crawford court deemed to be
the only protection against the "flagrant inquisitorial practices" the
Court so fears. Nowhere in Crawford does the Court even allude to the
proposition that, "if cross-examination will not help the defendant, there
is no need to afford the opportunity and the statement is nontestimo-
nial." On the contrary, whether cross-examination will aid the defendant
is not a factor in determining whether a statement is testimonial. A
criminal defendant has a right to subject all testimonial statements to the
process of cross-examination. Cross-examination is therefore not a fac-
tor in determining whether a statement is testimonial but rather it is a
necessary consequence when a statement is deemed testimonial.
C. The Uses of and Circumstances Surrounding Creation of
Laboratory Reports
Crawford focuses "solely upon government conduct in acquiring
evidence against the accused."' 167 The fear is that the government will
use "inquisitorial practices" '68 in furtherance of its prosecution of the
accused. Therefore, at a minimum, when the government is involved in
the creation of hearsay statements where the "primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution,"' 169 the statement is testimonial. The declar-
ant's state of mind while making the statement is immaterial.
1. NONACCUSATORY LABORATORY REPORTS ARE NONTESTIMONIAL;
LABORATORY REPORTS NOT DIRECTED TOWARD A
PARTICULAR DEFENDANT ARE NONTESTIMONIAL
A number of courts look to whether the laboratory report is "accu-
satory" in determining whether it is testimonial. 17° This approach is par-
167. Graham, Special Report, supra note 4, at 108.
168. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
169. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
170. See State v. Moss, 160 P.3d 1143, 1149 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (blood test prepared by
nontestifying criminalist from private laboratory on which testifying expert based testimony is
testimonial; "The testimony ... reporting the results would be, in essence, an accusation by the
absent criminalists that [the defendant] had ingested methamphetamine before the accident."),
review denied, opinion depublished, 173 P.3d 1021 (Ariz. 2007); People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104,
140 (Cal. 2007) (DNA report is nontestimonial; "[T]o the extent [that the nontestifying analyst's]
notes, forms and report merely recount the procedures she used to analyze the DNA samples, they
are not themselves accusatory .... "); People v. Hinojos-Mendoza, 140 P.3d 30, 37 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2005) (laboratory report showing a substance to be a controlled substance is nontestimonial;
"[W]hile the report names defendant, it contains no directly accusatorial statements against him."),
affTd in part, rev'd in part, 169 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2007); Johnson v. State, 929 So. 2d 4, 8 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (laboratory report created by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement is
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ticularly prevalent when the challenged report involves certification
records of breath-test machines. In Commonwealth v. Walther, the
lower court suppressed evidence consisting of
[t]hree sets of copies of maintenance and test records pertaining to
Intoxilyzer 5000 EN s/n 68-012628. Each set contained a notarized
certification by . . . the breath-alcohol technician who prepared and
had custody of them, that they were true and exact copies of the origi-
nal records maintained by him and that he prepared and maintained
them in the regular course of his duties as an employee of the Ken-
tucky State Police Breath Alcohol Maintenance Program.'71
The copies of the reports included lists of tests and other information
performed on and pertaining to the machine with handwritten notes such
as "verified" and "ok." Reviewing a certified question, 7 2 the Supreme
testimonial; "The nature of the statement is one that is intended to lodge a criminal accusation
against a defendant-in other words, it is testimonial."); People v. Kim, 859 N.E.2d 92, 93 (111.
App. Ct. 2006) (breath-test machine certification is nontestimonial; "Some courts have held that a
Breathalyzer certification is simply not accusatory: it does not accuse any particular person of any
particular crime."); Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky. 2006) (breath-test
machine certifications are nontestimonial; "[The preparer] did not accuse Respondent of any
wrongdoing."); State v. Carter, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 (Mont. 2005) ("[T]he certification reports
[for the breath-test machine] are nontestimonial in nature in that they are foundational, rather than
substantive or accusatory."); State v. O'Maley, 932 A.2d 1, 13 (N.H. 2007) (blood-sample-
collection form is nontestimonial; "The blood sample collection form did not accuse the defendant
of any wrongdoing."); People v. Lebrecht, 823 N.Y.S.2d 824, 828 (App. Term 2006) (breath-test
machine certifications are nontestimonial; "[Tihey did not constitute a direct accusation of an
essential element of any offense.") (citations omitted); Green v. DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d 772, 783
(Sup. Ct. 2005) (breath-test machine certifications are nontestimonial; "[N]either document...
accuses anyone of conduct that is criminal."); People v. Fisher, No. 04-1556, 2005 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 2409, at *6 (City Ct. Oct. 25, 2005) (foundational documents for breath-test machine are
nontestimonial; Crawford is concerned with "solemn formal accusations"); State v. Crager, 879
N.E.2d 745, 757 (Ohio 2007) (DNA report is nontestimonial; "Records of laboratory protocols
followed and the resulting raw data acquired are not accusatory."); Commonwealth v. Brown, No.
3082-05-1, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 152, at *8 (Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2006) (Sexual Assault nurse
Examiner Report is nontestimonial; "[S]uch laboratory reports do not involve statements to the
police or other government agents acting in their stead, which accuse another person of a crime.");
Anderson v. Commonwealth, 634 S.E.2d 372, 377 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (certificate of analysis
offered as prima facie evidence of chain of custody of materials tested is nontestimonial; "[Tihe
Confrontation Clause is aimed at protecting defendants from those people making accusations
against them.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 618 S.E.2d 347,
354 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (breath-test certificate including attestation machine in good working
order is nontestimonial; "[T]he statements do not accuse [the defendant] of any wrongdoing
..... ); Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 04-451, 2005 WL 3007781, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 10,
2005) (certificates of analysis stating a substance to be cocaine is nontestimonial; "They do not
accuse the defendant of any wrongdoing but rather simply serve to authenticate the routine test
results.").
171. Walther, 189 S.W.3d at 572.
172. The certified question read: "Can a certified copy of a breath-alcohol machine's
maintenance and test records be admitted into evidence to show compliance with [Kentucky
regulations concerning the accuracy of breach-alcohol machines] without in-court testimony by
the breath-alcohol technician who performed the maintenance and tests?" Id.
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Court of Kentucky determined that the reports were nontestimonial. The
court relied on the fact that the technician "did not accuse the Respon-
dent of any wrongdoing." 173
The technician did not accuse the defendant of any wrongdoing, but
that does not make the technician's statement nontestimonial. Webster's
dictionary defines "accusation" as "a charge of wrongdoing, delin-
quency, of fault: the declaration containing such a charge."' 174 In Craw-
ford, the declarant did not accuse the defendant of any wrongdoing; she
merely gave an arguably contradictory recitation of the events of a stab-
bing. Nowhere in her statement did the declarant charge the defendant
with wrongdoing. 75 In fact, it seemed as if the declarant was trying her
hardest not to implicate the defendant in any wrongdoing. An accusa-
tion, however, can be made without an express "charge" of wrongdoing.
In many situations, the declaration "he pushed me" is certainly an
implicit charge of wrongdoing. The question whether a statement is
accusatory is contextual and often only the putative accuser knows
whether he intends to accuse the other of something. Another declarant
may also say, "He pushed me." But there is no accusation in a context
in which the act of pushing does not constitute wrongdoing; there is
merely a recitation of events. 7 6 Under Crawford, the question is not
whether the hearsay statement is "accusatory" but whether the govern-
ment was involved in making the statement. When a Kentucky State
173. Id. at 575.
174. WEBSTER'S' THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 14 (1976).
175. The declarant stated:
Q. Did Kenny do anything to fight back from this assault?
A. (pausing) I know he reached into his pocket... or somethin' . .. I don't know
what.
Q. After he was stabbed?
A. He saw Michael coming up. He lifted his hand . . . his chest open, he might
[have] went to go strike his hand out or something and then (inaudible).
Q. Okay, you, you gotta speak up.
A. Okay, he lifted his hand over his head maybe to strike Michael's hand down or
something and then he put his hands in his ... put his right hand in his right pocket
... took a step back... Michael proceeded to stab him... then his hands were like
... how do you explain this ... open arms ... with his hands open and he fell down
... and we ran (describing subject holding hands open, palms toward assailant).
Q. Okay, when he's standing there with his open hands, you're talking about Kenny,
correct?
A. Yeah, after, after the fact, yes.
Q. Did you see anything in his hands at that point?
A. (pausing) um um (no).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 39-40 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. For example, if a person standing on railroad tracks is about to be run over by a train, a
statement, "he pushed me," if done to prevent him from getting hit by the train, is not an
accusation. But if a train hit a person after he was pushed onto the railroad tracks, the same
statement would certainly be an accusation.
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Police Breath Alcohol Maintenance Program technician makes a state-
ment, the government is clearly involved. If the Court in Crawford is
unwilling to leave the Sixth Amendment to the "vagaries or the rules of
evidence," then certainly the Court should be unwilling to leave it to the
"vagaries" of judicial determinations of "accusatorial-ness."
In Johnson v. State, the court reached a different result when ana-
lyzing a different type of laboratory report.'7 7 There the court reviewed
the admission of a "Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE)
lab report establishing the illegal nature of substances [the defendant]
possessed when the person who performed the test did not testify."' 78
The report was admitted as a business record through the testimony of
the supervisor of the person who performed the test. In finding the
admission to be a Confrontation Clause violation and the report to be
testimonial, the court relied on the fact that "[t]he nature of the statement
is one that is intended to lodge a criminal accusation against a defen-
dant-in other words, it is testimonial."' 79 This use of the accusatory
rationale seems no more correct in Johnson than it was in Walther.'8"
Again, being accusatorial does not matter under Crawford, because such
an inquiry wrongly focuses on the intent of the declarant. However,
while focusing on the intent of the declarant is clearly incorrect when the
declarant is a nongovernment witness, neither Crawford nor Davis
resolves the issue how to analyze hearsay statements when the declarant
is the government. One approach would be to treat the separate govern-
ment actors involved separately. For example, treat the technician in
Johnson like any other declarant, and the supervisor who was used to
offer the report into evidence as a government actor. Under such an
approach, the report would clearly be testimonial under Davis as "the
circumstances objectively indicate that . . . the primary purpose of the
interrogation [the receipt of the report] is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."'"' Another
approach would be to treat the government actors as part of one "declar-
ant" for Confrontation Clause purposes, in which case one could argue
177. 929 So. 2d 4, 8-9 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (certifying question: "Does the admission
of a Florida Department of Law Enforcement lab report establishing the illegal nature of
substances possessed by a defendant violate the Confrontation Clause and Crawford v.
Washington, when the person who performed the lab test did not testify?") (citation omitted),
certifying question to 924 So. 2d. 810 (Fla. 2006).
178. Id. at 5.
179. Id. at 8.
180. The difference in the outcome of the two cases may be explained as a result of judge's
intuitive sense that certain laboratory reports require the testimony of the preparer while others do
not. Unfortunately for these courts, Crawford, if it applies to government-created laboratory
reports, does not afford them any discretion to make such a determination.
181. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
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that because there was no statement made from a witness to a govern-
ment official the report is outside Crawford and subject only to the rig-
ors of the rules of evidence. If the government, however, is treated as a
single declarant, arguably the accusatory nature of the statement is not
an explicit concern. But under the definition of testimonial statements
from Davis-"to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution"-the government, while "interrogating"
itself, has created a testimonial statement. This is because the govern-
ment is certainly attempting to "establish or prove past events poten-
tially relevant to later criminal prosecutions." None of these approaches
receives any support from Crawford or Davis, and they all are highly
artificial. It is clear that whether the report is "accusatory" from the
declarant's point of view is not a factor in a Crawford analysis.
In a similar vein, a number of courts determine that certain labora-
tory reports are nontestimonial because they are not directed toward a
particular defendant.' 82 This approach is used primarily, if not exclu-
182. See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007) (breathalyzer-calibration
reports are nontestimonial; "Verification of calibration reports ... are not created in anticipation
of litigation in a particular case."); Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 129 P.3d 471, 478 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2006) (maintenance and calibration records of a breath-test machine are nontestimonial; "[T]he
recorded results of calibration testing in the abstract do not relate to any specific defendant or
particular case."); Pflieger v. State, 952 So. 2d 1251, 1253 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (annual
inspection report for breath-testing instrument is nontestimonial; "The evidence is not 'against'
any particular defendant."); Rackoff v. State, 621 S.E.2d 841, 845 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)
("Considering . . . that the certificates prepared under [the state statute] are records which are
routinely maintained and promulgated and ... not made in anticipation of prosecution against any
particular defendant, we hold that the inspection certificate . . . was not 'testimonial' hearsay
under Crawford.") (citation omitted); Jarrell v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1022, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)
(breath-test-machine certification report is nontestimonial; "[C]ertification of breath-test machines
is removed from the direct investigation or direct proof of whether any particular defendant has
operated a vehicle while intoxicated; the certificates are not prepared in anticipation of litigation
in any particular case or with respect to implicating any specific defendant."); Commonwealth v.
Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky. 2006) (breath-test-machine certification is nontestimonial;
"[The tester] did not make the notations in question for the purpose of proving Respondent's
guilt."); State v. Dorman, 922 A.2d 766, 769 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (breathalyzer-
machine certificate of operability is nontestimonial; "These decisions [finding laboratory reports
to be testimonial] have a common element triggering a defendant's right of confrontation: the
State's use of a document created for the specific purpose of establishing an essential element of
the offense. By contrast, the certificates of operability ... were not created with any specific case
in mind."), certification granted, 932 A.2d 26 (N.J. 2007) (granting petition of certification as to
"question of whether in light of Crawford v. Washington, the admission of the breathalyzer
machine certificate of operability violated the Confrontation Clause of the United States
Constitution") (citation omitted); People v. Hrubecky, No. 2006RI005491, 2006 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 3859, at *5 (Crim. Ct. Dec. 13, 2006) (test ampules, certified copies of stimulator-solution
certification, and maintenance records of a breath-test instrument are nontestimonial; "[T]he
[certifications] were [not] created at official request to gather incriminating evidence against a
particular individual."); People v. Lebrecht, 823 N.Y.S.2d 824, 828 (App. Term 2006) (breath-
test-machine certifications are nontestimonial; "[Tihey were not created at official request to
gather incriminating evidence against a particular individual .... ") (internal quotation marks
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sively, in regard to breath-test-machine certification reports. The ratio-
nale is largely that, because the laboratory report was not prepared with
a specific individual in mind, the preparer is not a "witness" as the term
is defined in Crawford.183
In State v. Shisler, the defendant was convicted of operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence. 184  The defendant challenged
his conviction, asserting that the lower court violated his Sixth Amend-
ment rights by admitting "a certificate signed by the director of health
indicating that he had approved the check solution" used to test the
breath machine that inculpated him. The director of health did not tes-
tify. In affirming the lower court's decision, the Court of Appeals of
Ohio stated that "the director of health was not a "witness against the
accused." The check-solution certificate was not prepared for use spe-
cifically against [the defendant]."'1 85  Assuming, arguendo, that the
director of health is part of the "government" contemplated by Craw-
ford, this approach receives little support from Crawford and Davis.
First, it ignores Crawford's definition of testimony: "[a] solemn declara-
tion or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact."' 86 Whether the director of health regarded the check solution as
adequate is certainly "some fact." Second, it is not clear in Crawford or
Davis for the proposition that an "interrogation" must have a particular
individual in mind. If after a mysterious murder, a police officer ques-
tioned the victim's husband, who was not a suspect, it seems any
response would be testimonial because "the circumstances objectively
indicate that there is no ... ongoing emergency, and that the primary
omitted); People v. Fisher, No. 04-1556, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2409, at *5 (City Ct. Oct. 25,
2005) (certification documents for breath-test machine are nontestimonial; in the four "core
testimonial statements" in Crawford "the witness's testimony is clearly being given 'against' a
specific accused regarding an identified offense"); Peope v. Mellott, No. 1173-05, 2005 WL
3322843, at *4 (N.Y. Just. Ct. Dec. 7, 2005) (breath-test-machine certification documents are
nontestimonial; "[D]ocuments made in the ordinary course of business by a public entity, without
a specific individual in mind and which purport to record the results of an objective test or
process, as is the case with breath test foundation documents, would normally be considered to be
nontestimonial in nature."); Vill. of Granville v. Eastman, No. 2006CA00050, 2006 Ohio App.
LEXIS 6213, at **9 (Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2006) (breath-test-machine certification is nontestimonial;
"[T]he documents were not prepared with an eye to a specific prosecution .... "); State v. Shisler,
No. C-050860, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 5251, at **14 (Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2006) (check-solution
certification for breath-test machine is nontestimonial; "The check solution certificate was not
prepared for use specifically against [the defendant].").
183. Crawford states that the Confrontation Clause applies to "'witnesses' against the
accused-in other words, those who 'bear testimony."' Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51
(2004) (quoting WEBSTER, supra note 27).
184. 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 5251, at **2.
185. Id. at **14.
186. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (quoting WEBSTER, supra note 27) (alteration in
original) (emphasis added).
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purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events poten-
tially relevant to later criminal prosecution."'' 87 That there is no specific
individual in mind certainly reduces the risk of governmental foul
play, 88 and under Roberts this would go to a reliability determination.
Yet this fact is irrelevant if the logic of Crawford is applied to certifica-
tions of breath-test machines.
2. THE LABORATORY REPORT COULD BE USED TO EXONERATE THE
DEFENDANT AND IS THEREFORE NONTESTIMONIAL
Some courts rely on an assertion that laboratory reports have the
power to exonerate as well as to inculpate a defendant in finding labora-
tory reports to be nontestimonial.t89 In State v. Forte, the defendant was
convicted of rape and murder and sentenced to death.'9 ° On appeal the
defendant contested the admission of laboratory reports created by an
agent with the State Bureau of Investigation ("SBI"). The reports
included results of the agent's analysis of blood and bodily fluid.
Because the agent had left the SBI before trial, the reports were admitted
though the testimony of the agent's supervisor under the North Carolina
187. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
188. Unless, of course, the Supreme Court is willing to recognize widespread governmental
conspiracies to convict massive amounts of innocent people. While the Court in Crawford and
Davis certainly views the government with a jaundiced eye, it seems unlikely that the Court would
take such an extreme view.
189. See People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 140 (Cal. 2007) (DNA report is nontestimonial; "DNA
analysis can lead to either incriminatory or exculpatory results."); People v. Kim, 859 N.E.2d 92,
94 (I11. App. Ct. 2006) (breath-test-machine certification is nontestimonial; "Indeed, it is
conceivable that a reading below 0.08 could have been used by the defense to exonerate a
suspect."); Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky. 2006) (breath-test-machine
certification is nontestimonial; "A properly operating breathalyzer machine could just as well
prove innocence as guilt."); State v. Russell, 966 So. 2d 154, 164 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (coroner's
report is nontestimonial; "The proof of the death or cause of death by a coroner's report is not
proof of guilt or innocence."); State v. O'Maley, 932 A.2d 1, 12 (N.H. 2007) (blood-test report
and blood-collection form are nontestimonial; "[The] report of laboratory protocols and the
resulting raw data were neutral, having the power to exonerate as well as convict.") (internal
quotation marks omitted); People v. Lebrecht, 823 N.Y.S.2d 824, 828 (App. Term 2006) (breath-
test certification is nontestimonial; "Proof that a BAC testing machine functions properly may
exonerate as well as incriminate ...."); Green v. DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d 772, 781 (Sup. Ct.
2005) (breath-test-machine certification of calibration is nontestimonial; "The testing . . . serves
the legitimate law enforcement purpose of weeding out persons who may have consumed alcohol
but whose blood alcohol level is not at the statutory level. Indeed, for those persons with blood
alcohol levels [below the legal limit], the breath test may exonerate them from any liability ....");
State v. Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137, 143 (N.C. 2006) (DNA laboratory report is nontestimonial; such
reports are "neutral, having the power to exonerate as well as convict."); State v. Crager, 879
N.E.2d 745, 757 (Ohio 2007) (DNA report is nontestimonial; "[It is] neutral, having the power to
exonerate as well as convict.") (internal quotation marks omitted). But see Vill. of Granville v.
Graziano, 139 Ohio Misc. 2d 29, 35 (Licking County Mun. Ct. 2006) (breath-test-machine
certifications are testimonial; "[T]he[ ] documents ...closely pertain to the issue of guilt or
innocence.. ..").
190. 629 S.E.2d at 140.
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business-records exception to the hearsay rule.' 9' On appeal the defen-
dant argued "that the introduction of the reports, containing both analy-
sis results and chain of custody information, violated his constitutional
right of confrontation."' 92 In affirming the conviction and rejecting the
defendant's argument, the court stated that the laboratory reports "do not
bear witness against the defendant .... Instead, they are neutral, having
the power to exonerate as well as convict."' 93 If one accepts this ratio-
nale, no statements would ever be testimonial. Every investigation and
interrogation has the power, or at least potential, to "exonerate as well as
convict." The officers who interrogated the declarant in Crawford con-
ceivably could have received statements corroborating the defendant's
version of events, but they did not. One cannot reasonably argue that
the inculpatory statement is nontestimonial on the ground that a witness
could have exculpated the defendant.
In Village of Granville v. Graziano, the court at a suppression hear-
ing admitted, over the defendant's Confrontation Clause objections, a
packet of documents relating to the certification of a breath-test
machine.194 In later granting the defendant's motion to suppress, the
court found that "the pretest and posttest instrument check documents
qualif[ied] as testimonial statements under Crawford."'195 The court so
found because the documents "more closely pertain[ed] to the issue of
guilt or innocence than the other documents."' 196 This approach, which
seems to repudiate the approach taken in Forte, is also incorrect. The
question is not how closely evidence relates to "guilt or innocence,"
because all relevant evidence is so related. Rather, the question under
Crawford and Davis is whether the government was attempting to col-
lect evidence "potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution."' 97
Such evidence necessarily relates to "guilt or innocence" if it is offered
by the prosecution. While these cases are wrong if Crawford applies,
both cases show the extreme difficulty in applying Crawford and Davis
to laboratory reports. The difficulty comes from the fact that neither
Crawford nor Davis clearly apply and neither answers the question
whether laboratory reports are testimonial. Faced with a Confrontation
Clause challenge to the admission of laboratory reports offered without
191. Id. at 142; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-Cl, Rule 803(6) (West 2007) ("Records of
Regularly Conducted Activity").
192. 629 S.E.2d at 142.
193. Id. at 143.
194. 139 Ohio Misc. 2d 29. The court discussed and decided that the Confrontation Clause
applies to suppression hearings. Id. at 33. The validity of this decision is irrelevant to the analysis
here.
195. Id. at 35.
196. Id.
197. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
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the preparer's testimony, the courts have little option but to "wing it"
and try their best to achieve a proper result. It is not the failure of state
courts precipitating the divergent results regarding laboratory reports but
the utter failure of Crawford and Davis to supply a workable framework.
3. PREPARED FOR LITIGATION OR EXPECTED TO BE USED
PROSECUTORIALLY
In determining whether a report is testimonial, a number of courts
rely on a distinction between laboratory reports prepared for litigation or
for use in a prosecution and those that are not. 19 8 In Martin v. State, the
198. See State v. Moss, 160 P.3d 1143, 1149 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (blood test prepared by
nontestifying criminalist from private laboratory on which expert based testimony is testimonial;
"The criminalists who performed the blood tests and interpreted the results surely expected their
statements of the results to be used prosecutorially."), review denied, opinion depublished, 173
P.3d 1021 (Ariz. 2007); Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 667 (Colo. 2007) (laboratory
report is testimonial; "There can be no serious dispute that the sole purpose of the report was to
analyze the substance found in [the defendant's] vehicle in anticipation of criminal prosecution.");
Pflieger v. State, 952 So. 2d 1251, 1254 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (breathalyzer-certification
documents are nontestimonial; "Using these reports for a litigation purpose is a secondary purpose
and therefore does not raise the concerns expressed in Crawford of unreliability."); Martin v.
State, 936 So. 2d 1190, 1192 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (Florida Department of Law
Enforcement report indicating substance to be contraband is testimonial; "[T]he report obviously
was prepared for litigation purposes."); Shiver v. State, 900 So. 2d 615, 618 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2005) (breath-test affidavit relied on to prove the date of performance of the most recent
required maintenance is testimonial; "It contained statements one would reasonably expect to be
used prosecutorially, and was made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness to
reasonably believe the statements would be available for trial."); People v. Horton, No. 268264,
2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 2033, at *10 (Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2007) ("[The non-testifying serologists']
reports and findings [are testimonial because they] clearly qualif[ied] as statements that [the non-
testifying serologists] would reasonably expect would be used in a prosecutorial manner and at
trial.") (third and fourth alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); State v.
Weaver, 733 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (laboratory test and results created at the
request of the medical examiner as part of an autopsy occurring during a homicide investigation
are testimonial; "The critical determinative factor in assessing whether a statement is testimonial
is whether it was 'prepared for litigation."'); State v. Sickmann, No. A05-2478, 2006 Minn. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 1329, at *8 (Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2006) ("[T]he medical-personnel certificate [is]
considered testimonial because it contains statements that one would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially and be available for trial."); State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Mo. 2007) ("A
laboratory report ... that was prepared solely for prosecution to prove an element of the crime
charged is 'testimonial' because it bears all the characteristics of an ex parte affidavit."); City of
Las Vegas v. Walsh, 124 P.3d 203, 208 (Nev. 2005) (nurse's affidavits offered to prove certain
facts relating to the withdrawal of blood for testing purposes are testimonial; "[T]hey are made for
use at a later trial or legal proceeding."); State v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (N.M. 2004) (blood-
alcohol report admitted without testimony of the nurse who drew the blood is nontestimonial;
"[T]he report is not investigative or prosecutorial."); People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396
(App. Div. 2004) (DNA analysis report created at the request of the police is testimonial; "[T]he
report here was requested by and prepared for law enforcement for the purpose of prosecution.");
State v. Warlick, No. M2005-01477-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 394, at *19
(Crim. App. May 17, 2007) (medical records and laboratory reports created by private hospital are
nontestimonial; "The tests were conducted by the hospital for the purpose of providing medical
treatment to the Appellant, not for the purpose of preparing for future litigation.").
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defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine and cannabis.1 99 On
appeal, the defendant argued "that the trial court erred in admitting, over
objection, a report of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement
(FDLE), which indicated that the substances seized from [the defendant]
were contraband. ' 20  The report was admitted as a business record in
lieu of testimony by the preparer of the report. In finding the admission
of the report to be reversible error under the Confrontation Clause, the
court noted that one of the "various formulations" of testimonial state-
ments are "statements that were made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would
be available for use at a later trial. '20 1 The court concluded that the
report was testimonial because it "contained statements one would rea-
sonably expect to be used prosecutorially and was made under circum-
stances which would lead an objective witness to reasonably believe the
statement would be available for trial. 20 2 The court was correct that an
objective witness would be led to believe the statements made in the
laboratory report would be available for use at trial. Although the
approach may be reasonable, it has a great potential to precipitate signif-
icant failures of the justice system. For example, if a laboratory techni-
cian who performed a test is unavailable and there is no way to re-do the
tests that the technician had performed, guilty and perhaps highly dan-
gerous individuals will go free. Whether Crawford was meant to apply
to laboratory reports at all is unclear. Regardless of the reasonableness
of the approach, it is far from clear that the Court in Crawford or Davis
intended this result. Additionally, despite being included in the two for-
mulations of testimonial, focusing on what the witness believed is incor-
rect given the historical background provided in Crawford.2 °3
4. INVOLVEMENT OF GOVERNMENT OR LAW-ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
WITH AN "EYE TOWARD TRIAL"
Many courts look to whether the laboratory report was prepared by
law-enforcement or government officials in anticipation of prosecution
in determining whether a laboratory report is testimonial. 2" The analy-
199. 936 So. 2d at 1191.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1192 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 52 (2004)) (emphasis
omitted).
202. Id. (quoting Shiver, 900 So. 2d at 618).
203. See Graham, Special Report, supra note 4.
204. See Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 667 (Colo. 2007) (laboratory report is
testimonial; "[It] was prepared at the direction of the police and a copy of the report was
transmitted to the district attorney's office."); Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 14 (D.C.
2006) (Drug Enforcement Agency chemist's written statement is testimonial; "[B]ecause DEA
chemist's reports are created expressly for use in criminal prosecutions as a substitute for live
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testimony against the accused, such reports are testimonial .... "); Williams v. State, 933 So. 2d
1283, 1284 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (breath-test affidavit is testimonial; "[R]eport prepared
pursuant to police investigation and offered to establish an element of a crime [is] testimonial
hearsay and inadmissible in the absence of establishing the Crawford conditions."); id. at 1285
(certifying question to the Florida Supreme Court: "Does admission of a breath test affidavit
violate the Confrontation Clause and Crawford v. Washington, when the technician who
performed breath test does not testify?") (citation omitted); Sobota v. State, 933 So. 2d 1277, 1278
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (results of blood test prepared by toxicologist at a county forensic lab
is testimonial) (certifying question: "Does admission of a test result from a legal blood drawn
violate the Confrontation Clause and Crawford v. Washington, when the toxicologist who
performed the blood test does not testify?") (citation omitted), certifying question to 924 So. 2d
810 (Fla. 2006)); Johnson v. State, 929 So. 2d 4, 7, 8-9 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (laboratory
report created by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement is testimonial; "[W]e hold that an
FDLE lab report prepared pursuant to police investigation and admitted to establish an element of
a crime is testimonial hearsay ....") (certifying question: "Does the admission of a Florida
Department of Law Enforcement lab report establishing the illegal nature of substances possessed
by a defendant violate the Confrontation Clause and Crawford v. Washington, when the person
who performed the lab test did not testify?") (citation omitted), certifying question to 924 So.2d.
810 (Fla. 2006); Belvin v. State, 922 So. 2d 1046, 1050, 1053 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(affidavit of technician who administered breath tests is testimonial; "Breath test affidavits are
usually generated by law enforcement for use at a later criminal trial or driver's license revocation
proceeding.") (certifying question: "Does admission of those portions of the breath test affidavit
pertaining to the breath test operator's procedures and observations in administering the breath test
constitute testimonial evidence and violate the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause in light
of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Crawford v. Washington?") (citation omitted),
certifying question to 928 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 2006); Rackoff v. State, 621 S.E.2d 841, 845 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2005) (inspection certificate for breath-test machine is nontestimonial; "[The report was] not
made in anticipation of prosecution ...."); State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 754 (Iowa 2006)
(laboratory-test report prepared years earlier for health reasons by a hospital showing the
defendant to be HIV positive are nontestimonial; "The HIV tests were not requested by law
enforcement; they were done two years before the crime at issue here was even committed.");
State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 309 (Minn. 2006) (Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
laboratory report identifying substance as cocaine is testimonial; "ITjhe critical determinative
factor in assessing whether a statement is testimonial is whether it was prepared for litigation.");
State v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (N.M. 2004) (blood-alcohol report prepared by the Scientific
Laboratory Division of the Department of Health and admitted without testimony of the nurse
who drew the blood is nontestimonial despite being "prepared for trial"); People v. Rogers, 780
N.Y.S.2d 393, 397 (App. Div. 2004) (laboratory report of DNA analysis prepared by a private
laboratory at the request of the police is testimonial; "[Tlhe test was initiated by the prosecution
and generated by the desire to discover evidence against defendant, the results were testimonial.");
People v. Brown, 801 N.Y.S.2d 709, 712 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (DNA profile report from private lab
subcontracted by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner and the medical examiner's office
itself are nontestimonial because neither laboratory is part of law enforcement and "the notes of
the DNA testers were not prepared solely for litigation but were routine entries made to assist in
the profiling of DNA"); People v. Orpin, 796 N.Y.S.2d 512, 516 (Just. Ct. 2005) (inspection,
maintenance, and calibration records of breath-test machine prepared by state division of criminal
justice and certification of analysis of stimulator solution prepared by state-police forensic-
investigation center are testimonial; "It is difficult to conceive of any purpose in preparing these
documents other than for use in DWI cases."), rev'd sub. nom. Green v. DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d
772 (Sup. Ct. 2005); State v Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137, 143 (N.C. 2006) (DNA report is
nontestimonial; "Although we acknowledge that the reports were prepared with the understanding
that eventual use in court was possible or even probable, they were not prepared exclusively for
trial and [the preparing agent] had no interest in the outcome of any trial in which the records
might be used."); State v. Miller, 144 P.3d 1052, 1056 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (finding laboratory
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sis of this approach is much the same as the section above. But even
cases that rely on the fact that the government was involved in making
the laboratory reports may overly narrow the definition of "testimonial"
found in Crawford and Davis.
In State v. Caulfield, the defendant challenged his conviction of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.205 In find-
ing that the lower court erred in admitting a Bureau of Criminal Investi-
gation laboratory report through a state statute deemed
unconstitutional,20 6 the court stated, "the critical determinative factor...
is whether [the laboratory report] was prepared for litigation. ' 20 7 It
seems, however, that the ambit of testimonial statements may run wider
than merely statements "prepared for litigation." Crawford's formulation
of "testimonial" that courts frequently cite and incorrectly use is "state-
ments that were made under circumstances which would lead an objec-
tive witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial."20 8 Davis defines testimonial statements made
"when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no ... ongo-
ing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prose-
cution. 20 9 Whether a laboratory report "would be available" or is
"potentially relevant" is a far more expansive definition than "prepared
for litigation." Under the former two statements, even if a report was
not prepared for litigation per se but was simply something that could
possibly be admitted in a criminal trial, the report would be testimonial
if the government was involved in its creation.
Another problem with this approach involves how to determine
which governmental agencies, or nongovernmental entities acting at the
government's behest, are within the scope of Crawford. This question
reports prepared by the Oregon State Police Laboratory showing substance to be controlled are
testimonial because they were made "for the purpose of establishing or proving a fact in issue in
the case being prosecuted") (quoting State v. Norman, 125 P.3d 15 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)); State v.
Warlick, No. M2005-01477-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 394, at * 19 (Crim. App.
May 17, 2007) (medical records and laboratory reports created by private hospital are
nontestimonial; "The records were not prepared at the request of the police, nor were the tests
performed by a police laboratory.").
205. 722 N.W.2d at 306.
206. Id. at 313. The court found the statute to be unconstitutional despite affording the
defendant an opportunity to request the preparer of the report. The court stated that because the
statute "does not require adequate notice to the defendant, we conclude that it violates the
Confrontation Clause." Id.
207. Id. at 309.
208. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004) (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
209. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (emphasis added).
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has produced widely disparate answers.21 ° In Crawford, the Court stated
that "[t]he involvement of government officers in the production of testi-
monial evidence presents the same risk, whether the officers are police
or justices of the peace."21' Whether this statement intends to apply the
Confrontation Clause to all government officers or merely the police and
similar law-enforcement entities is unclear.21 2 In resolving (or, more
accurately, in not resolving) whether a 911 operator is part of law
enforcement, states,
[i]f 911 operators are not themselves law enforcement officers, they
may at least be agents of law enforcement when they conduct interro-
gations of 911 callers. For purposes of this opinion (and without
deciding the point), we consider their acts to be acts of the police. As
in Crawford v. Washington, therefore, our holding today makes it
unnecessary to consider whether and when statements made to some-
one other than law enforcement personnel are "testimonial.
213
Thus, Davis leaves open the possibility that statements to non-law-
enforcement government officers as well as law-enforcement agents
may at times be testimonial.21 4 Of course, none of this answers the
210. See People v. Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d 610, 619-20 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (Michigan State
Police Crime Laboratories serologist's notes and laboratory report are testimonial; "[T]he State
Police Crime lab is an arm of law enforcement .. "); State v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628, 635 (N.M.
2004) (Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD) of the Department of Health preparing a blood-
alcohol report is nontestimonial; "SLD employees are not police officers nor are they law
enforcement personnel. Therefore, blood alcohol reports . . . are prepared in a non-adversarial
setting."); People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396 (App. Div. 2004) (lab report prepared by a
private laboratory is testimonial; "[It] was requested by and prepared for law enforcement for the
purpose of prosecution."); People v. Brown, 801 N.Y.S.2d 709, 711 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (DNA
laboratory reports prepared by a criminologist employed by the Office of the Chief Medical
Examiner and a private subcontracted laboratory are nontestimonial; "The OCME is not a law
enforcement agency and is by law, independent of and not subject to the control of the office of
the prosecutor.") (quoting People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 868 (Sup. Ct. 2005)); Durio, 794
N.Y.S.2d at 868 (autopsy report prepared by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner is
nontestimonial; "The OCME is not a law enforcement agency and is by law, independent of and
not subject to the control of the office of the prosecutor.") (internal quotation marks omitted);
State v. Cao, 626 S.E.2d 301, 305 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (laboratory report determining substance
to be controlled is nontestimonial despite report being made at the request of a police officer).
211. 541 U.S. at 53. This statement was made in the context of the Court downplaying the
difference between English Justices of the Peace of the sixteenth century and police officers of
today. According to the Court, the similarity between the two is their "investigative and
prosecutorial function." Id. It can certainly be argued that at least some governmental
laboratories perform an "investigative" function, and are thus within the purview of Crawford.
212. But see Graham, Special Report, supra note 4, at 77 ("Thus only statements made
following government official initiated ex parte judicial examination or police interrogation
developed in anticipation of or in aid of potential criminal litigation are encompassed within the
core meaning of the Confrontation Clause.").
213. 547 U.S. at 823 n.2.
214. Cf. 4 GRAHAM, HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 802:2, at 4 (Supp. 2008), stating:
Pursuant to Davis, any statement made to or elicited by a police officer, other law
enforcement personnel, or a judicial officer under circumstances objectively
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question whether a report created by a non-law-enforcement governmen-
tal agency (or one created by a law-enforcement official) is testimonial.
State-court responses run from: if the report, even if created by a private
laboratory, is requested by law enforcement, then it is subject to the
Crawford analysis, 215 to holding that reports created by a state "crime
laboratory" at the request of the police are not.21 6
People v. Brown exemplifies the confusion created by the question
of which parts of the government or agents of it are capable of produc-
ing testimonial statements.21 7 In Brown, a criminologist employed by
the New York Office of the Chief Medical Examiner ("OCME") testi-
fied based on two laboratory reports stating the results of DNA analy-
sis. 218 One report was created by the OCME and the other by a private
laboratory subcontracted by the OCME.219 Both reports were admitted
into evidence as business records and the preparers of the reports did not
testify.22° In rejecting the defense motion for a new trial, the court
found there to be no Confrontation Clause violation in admitting the
reports because "[t]he OCME is not a law enforcement agency and is by
law, independent of and not subject to the control of the office of the
prosecutor.22 1 Whether the government is able to legislate around
whether a governmental entity is subject to the rigors of Crawford is
highly questionable. Also, if the decision had come out differently as to
whether the OCME is a branch of law enforcement (as a number of
courts have), the analysis whether the laboratory report from the private
laboratory is testimonial changes. If the OCME is considered part of
law enforcement, then the private laboratory report could be analyzed
like any other statement under Davis. Under such an analysis, the report
would surely be testimonial. 2  Thus, if laboratory reports are to be sub-
ject to the rigors of Crawford, the Court will need to decide whether and
when non-law-enforcement governmental agencies are subject to
review. If they are not, what constitutes "law enforcement" for Con-
indicating at the time made that the primary purpose to which the statement will be
used by the government is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution is "testimonial".
215. See, e.g., Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 396-97.
216. See, e.g., State v. Cao, 626 S.E.2d 301, 304-05 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
217. 801 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
218. Id. at 709-10.
219. Id. at 710.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 711 (quoting People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 868 (Sup. Ct. 2005)) (emphasis
added).
222. This is so because the report would be a statement made to law enforcement "when the
circumstances objectively indicate.., that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish
or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
[Vol. 62:839
2008]LABORATORY REPORTS UNDER CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 887
frontation Clause purposes? If non-law-enforcement governmental
agencies are subject to review, which ones? These deceptively innocu-
ous questions will not lead to easy answers. The answers will have
wide-ranging effects not only on laboratory reports created by the gov-
ernment but also on those created by private laboratories for use by the
government.
5. EXPERT OPINION
A few courts have attempted to avoid the Confrontation Clause's
application to laboratory reports by claiming that the report is not admit-
ted for its truth when an expert testifies to his opinion regarding whether
a substance was drugs, the results of DNA analysis, and the like based
on a laboratory report.223 In State v. Delaney, an agent with the North
Carolina State Bureau of Investigation performed an analysis on sub-
stances seized from the defendant's home.224 At trial an agent who was
also employed by the Bureau of Investigation "testified as an expert wit-
223. See State v. Cannady, No. COA07-274, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 2537, at *10 (Ct. App.
Dec. 18, 2007) ("[E]xpert testimony based on analysis conducted by someone other than the
testifying expert does not violate a defendant's right to confrontation under Crawford."); State v.
Pettis, 651 S.E.2d 231, 234 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (expert testifying based on contents of DNA
report prepared by a nontestifying state bureau of investigations agent is not a Confrontation
Clause violation; "[I]t is well established [that there is no violation of a defendant's right of
confrontation under the rationale of Crawford when] an expert ... base[s] an opinion on tests
performed by others in the field and [d]efendant was given an opportunity to cross-examine [the
testifying expert] on the basis of his opinion[.]") (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted); State v. Palestino, No. COA06-185, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 2000, at *5-6 (Ct. App.
Oct. 3, 2006) (holding that no Confrontation Clause violation occurred where colleague of agent
who prepared chemical-analysis report and field notes testifies to his expert opinion based on the
report); State v. Shelly, 627 S.E.2d 287, 299-300 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (gunshot-residue testing
report, testified to as basis of expert opinion by agent who did not prepare the report, not deciding
whether the report is testimonial but quoting State v. Delaney, 613 S.E.2d 699 (N.C. Ct. App.
2005), for the proposition that the basis of an expert opinion itself inadmissible into evidence can
not be the ground for a Confrontation Clause violation); Delaney, 613 S.E.2d at 700 (analyst who
did not prepare a laboratory report but relies on it as a basis for expert opinion at trial is not a
Confrontation Clause violation; "The admission into evidence of expert opinion based upon
information not itself admissible into evidence does not violate the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
the right of an accused to confront his accusers where the expert is available for cross-
examination.") (quoting State v. Huffstetler, 322 S.E.2d 110, 120 (N.C. 1984)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 151 (Tenn. 2007) (expert testimony based on
DNA analysis of nontestifying analyst does not violate the Confrontation Clause; "Crawford ...
did not involve expert witness testimony and thus did not alter an expert witness's ability to
rely on (without repeating to the jury) otherwise inadmissible evidence in formulating his opinion
....") (quoting United States v. Henry, 472 F.3d 910, 914 (D.C. Cir. 2007)) (ellipses in original).
But see State v. Moss, 160 P.3d 1143, 1149, 1147 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (blood test prepared by
nontestifying criminalist from private laboratory on which expert based testimony is testimonial;
"[I]f the expert merely acts as a conduit for another non-testifying expert's opinion, the expert
opinion is hearsay and inadmissible ....") (internal quotation marks omitted), review denied,
opinion depublished, 173 P.3d 1021 (Ariz. 2007).
224. 613 S.E.2d at 700.
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ness regarding the results of those analyses. 225 On appeal, the court
noted that "Crawford made explicit that its holding was not applicable to
evidence admitted for reasons other than proving the truth of the matter
asserted. 226 The court then found there to have been no violation of the
defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause because "[i]t is the
expert opinion itself, not the underlying factual basis, that constitutes
substantive evidence[,] and. . . [a]n expert may properly base his or her
opinion on tests performed by another person, if the tests are of the type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. 22 7
This approach is a bastardization of generally accepted evidence
law and, should Crawford apply to laboratory reports, certainly will not
pass muster. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence as well as many state
rules, a so-called expert who merely summarizes the content of a single
inadmissible source is not a true expert but a "summary" or "conduit"
expert.228  Although Crawford states that the Confrontation Clause
"does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than
establishing the truth of the matter asserted, '' 229 a summary expert
merely attempts to introduce inadmissible hearsay in the guise of expert
opinion. Evidence law and Crawford, should it apply, cannot abide such
pretext.23 °
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 700-01 (citing State v. Fair, 557 S.E.2d 500, 522 (N.C. 2001)) (alterations in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
228. See United States v. Williams, 431 F.2d 1168, 1172 (5th Cir. 1970) ("If the witness has
gone to only one hearsay source and seeks merely to summarize the content of that source, then he
is acting as a summary witness, not an expert. Since he is introducing the content of the
extrajudicial statements or writings to prove truth, his testimony, like its source, is hearsay and is
inadmissible unless the source qualifies under an exception to the hearsay rule. When, however,
the witness has gone to many sources-although some or all be hearsay in nature-and rather
than introducing mere summaries of each source he uses them all, along with his own professional
experience, to arrive at his opinion, that opinion is regarded as evidence in its own right and not as
an attempt to introduce hearsay in disguise.") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 2
GRAHAM, HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 703.1, at 362 n.12 (same).
229. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004).
230. Other courts have recognized the invalidity of the approach propounded in Delaney. See
People v. Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d 610, 620 n.12 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that such an approach
would not past muster under Roberts and will not under Crawford; "The critical point ... is the
distinction between an expert who forms an opinion based in part on the work of others and an
expert who merely summarizes the work of others. In short, one expert cannot act as a mere
conduit for the opinion of another.") (quoting State v. Williams, 644 N.W.2d 919, 926 (Wis.
2002)) (ellipsis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Barton, 709 N.W.2d 93, 96
(Wis. Ct. App. 2005) (expert who performed independent review of report may testify to "his
independent opinion."); see also Roberts v. United States, 916 A.2d 922, 939 (D.C. 2007)
(denying government's reliance on the "expert witness paradigm" because the government
conceded "some of the test results on which [the expert's] opinion was based ... were offered as
substantive evidence") (ellipsis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); People v.
Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732-33 (N.Y. 2005) (noting in a context analogous to Delaney that
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6. THE LABORATORY REPORT IS ONLY "FOUNDATIONAL"
Some courts rely on an assertion that the laboratory report in ques-
tion is "foundational" and therefore admissible under the Confrontation
Clause without the preparer's in-court testimony.231 In State v. Carter,
the Montana Supreme Court found the Confrontation Clause not to be
implicated when "the State introduces a certification report for a breath
analysis instrument without also providing the author of the report for
cross-examination." '232 The court so found because "such certification
reports are not substantive evidence of a particular offense, but rather are
foundational evidence necessary for the admission of substantive evi-
dence. In other words, the certification reports are nontestimonial in
nature in that they are foundational, rather than substantive or accusa-
tory." '2 33 This novel approach finds no support in either the law of evi-
dence or in the text of Crawford or Davis. The rules of evidence apply
"[t]he distinction between a statement offered for its truth and a statement offered to shed light on
an expert's opinion is not meaningful").
231. See People v. Johnson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230, 233 (Ct. App. 2004) (laboratory report form
the Alameda County Crime Laboratory analyzing substance is nontestimonial; "[T]he need for
confrontation is particularly important where the evidence is testimonial, because of the
opportunity for observation of the witness's demeanor. Generally, the witness's demeanor is not a
significant factor in evaluating foundational testimony relating to the admission of evidence such
as laboratory reports ....") (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
State v. Carter, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 (Mont. 2005) (breath-test-machine certification report is
nontestimonial; "[S]uch certification reports are not substantive evidence of a particular offense,
but rather are foundational evidence necessary for the admission of substantive evidence. In other
words, the certification reports are nontestimonial in nature in that they are foundational, rather
than substantive or accusatory.") (citation omitted); Notti v. State, No. DV-05-89, 2005 Mont.
Dist. LEXIS 1713, at *14 (Dist. Ct. Dec. 9, 2005) (DNA report nontestimonial; "[The report was]
foundational evidence necessary for admission of substantive evidence.... [T]he DNA report...
was non-testimonial evidence used to buttress actual witness testimony on both sides of the
case."); Green v. DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d 772, 783 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (breath-test-certification
documents are nontestimonial; "The person who does the calibration-testing or solution-testing is
purely a foundational witness .... ); People v. Fisher, No. 04-1556, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
2409, at *13 (City Ct. Oct. 25, 2005) (breath-test-machine certification documents are
nontestimonial; "All of [the] documents are foundational."); State v. Cook, No. WD-04-029, 2005
Ohio App. LEXIS 1514, at **10 (Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2005) (affidavit of custodian of breath-test-
machine certifications is testimonial but no Confrontation Clause violations; "[I]t is not evidence
against appellant; it merely lays the foundation for the attached documents."); Anderson v.
Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 708 (Va. 2007) (statutory presumption of chain of custody of
materials analyzed in certificate of analysis does not violate the Confrontation Clause; "[T]he
evidentiary presumption regarding chain of custody is relevant to the admissibility of the
evidence. It is the substance of the evidence, namely the content of the certificate, that is a
Isolemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact'
accusatory to [the defendant]."); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 634 S.E.2d 372, 377 (Va. Ct. App.
2006) (certificate of analysis showing the result of a DNA test admitted under statute providing
for the certificate to be prima facie evidence of chain of custody is nontestimonial; "[Tlhe chain-
of-custody verification provides only foundation evidence ....
232. 114 P.3d at 1002.
233. Id. at 1007.
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equally to evidence admitted as "substantive" evidence as they do to so-
called "foundational" evidence. It is not completely clear what Carter
and cases like it mean by "substantive" evidence as opposed to "founda-
tional" evidence. However, whether evidence is offered to lay a founda-
tion or as direct proof of an element of a crime, it is substantive. Breath-
test-machine certifications are certainly offered for their truth or else
they would be of no value to the case. Evidence offered to provide a
foundation for other evidence is vital because such evidence provides
other evidence with its evidentiary value. 234  That the "foundational"
versus "substantive" dichotomy receives no support under Crawford is
made clear by the following example. Suppose a witness, Morgan, who
was involved in a robbery, makes a statement against penal interests to a
police officer after being shown a gun found in a dumpster a mile away
from a store where a robbery took place. Morgan states, "Ok. You got
me, I was the getaway driver, and I know that gun. It is Annie's. She
used it to rob the store. How do I know it is the gun she used? I saw her
with it in the car before the robbery and have seen her with it a number
of times." If Morgan does not testify at Annie's trial for robbery, the
state cannot call the officer to testify to the statement in order to lay a
foundation for the gun because the statement is testimonial. This is so
despite the fact that the statement is offered as "foundational" evidence
to tie Annie to the gun. Thus, should Crawford apply to laboratory
reports, the fact that they are offered to lay a foundation for other evi-
dence will not save them from being testimonial.235
7. LABORATORY REPORTS ARE NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR LIVE
TESTIMONY; DO NOT BEAR TESTIMONY
Some courts assert that a laboratory report is not a substitute for
live testimony and is therefore nontestimonial.236 Similarly, other courts
234. For example, drugs offered into evidence against a defendant alleged to have possessed
drugs are of absolutely no probative value unless a proper foundation is laid showing that the
drugs offered were those possessed by the defendant, the substance was in fact contraband, and so
forth.
235. Other courts realize that foundation evidence can give rise to a Confrontation Clause
violation. See, for example, Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), noting
that the State's failure to provide testimony of an officer who performed a breath test on the
defendant "runs afoul of the Confrontation Clause .... [T]he State failed to establish an adequate
evidentiary foundation for the admission of the test results into evidence."
236. See People v. Salinas, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 302, 305 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding nontestimonial a
laboratory report showing substance to be methamphetamine because the report was not "offered
as a substitute for live testimony"); Johnson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 233 (laboratory report form the
Alameda County Crime Laboratory analyzing substance is nontestimonial; "[T]he laboratory
report was not a substitute for live testimony at [the defendant's] revocation hearing; it was
routine documentary evidence."); Green, 812 N.Y.S.2d at 784 (breath-test-machine certification is
nontestimonial; "[T]he evidence at issue here records facts as easily and reliably proven by the
[Vol. 62:839
2008]LABORATORY REPORTS UNDER CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 891
state that laboratory reports are nontestimonial because the purpose of a
laboratory report is to comply with a statute or regulation. 237 Using the
former approach, the court in Commonwealth v. Williams found a certifi-
cate of analysis created by the Virginia Department of Forensic Sciences
reporting the results of chemical testing to be nontestimonial.238 The
report was admitted into evidence under a state statute and without testi-
mony from the forensic scientist who prepared the report.2 39 In support
of finding the certificate nontestimonial, the court agreed with a Califor-
nia court that "[a] laboratory report does not bear testimony, or function
as the equivalent of in-court testimony. 24 ° Rather, the court asserted,
certificates of analysis are "routine documentary evidence."24' Using
the latter approach, the court, in State v. Shisler, found a check-solution
certificate for a breath-test machine to be nontestimonial.242 The gov-
documents themselves as by live testimony."); Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 04-451, 2005 WL
3007781, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 10, 2005) (certificate of analysis from Virginia Department of
Forensic Science reporting result of chemical testing is nontestimonial; "[It] does not bear
testimony, or function as the equivalent of in-court testimony.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
237. See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007) (breathalyzer-calibration
reports are nontestimonial; "Verification of calibration reports are mandated by the administrative
rules, are created whether or not the DataMaster machine whose calibration is being verified is
used, and are not created in anticipation of litigation in a particular case.") (footnotes omitted);
Pflieger v. State, 952 So. 2d 1251, 1254 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that breathalyzer-
inspection reports are nontestimonial because the "inspection report ... is intended for the non-
testimonial purpose of making sure the machine is working properly"); Commonwealth v.
Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky. 2006) (breath-test-machine certification is nontestimonial;
"[T]he records have a primary business purpose that would exist "to assure compliance with [the
state statute], even in the absence of this litigation."); Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 839 (Md.
2006) (autopsy report is nontestimonial; "It is clear that there is a statutory duty to prepare such a
report when a death has occurred in 'any suspicious or unusual manner."'); People v. Hrubecky,
No. 2006RI005491, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3859, at *5-6 (Crim. Ct. Dec. 13, 2006) (breath-test-
machine certification documents are nontestimonial under Davis; "[T]he 'primary purpose' of the
certifications, which were in compliance with [the New York statute], was not to offer testimony
against the defendant, but to certify as to the operation of equipment."); People v. Lebrecht, 823
N.Y.S.2d 824, 827 (App. Term 2006) (breath-test-machine certification is nontestimonial; "The
certificates were prepared . . . to fulfill an official mandate that the machines be maintained in
working order."); Green, 812 N.Y.S.2d at 782 (breath-test-machine certification is nontestimonial;
"The records kept by the State Police are mandated [by state statute], as 'memorials of the fact
that the tests were made and what the results were."'); State v. Shisler, Nos. C-050860, C-050861,
2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 5251, at **14 (Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2006) (check-solution certification for
breath-test machine is nontestimonial; "[T]he testing of the check solution here would have
occurred even in the absence of charges against [the defendant] to ensure compliance with [the
state statute].").
238. 2005 WL 3007781, at *3-4.
239. Id. at *1; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187 (West 2007) ("Admission into evidence of
certain certificates of analysis").
240. Williams, 2005 WL 3007781, at *3 (quoting Johnson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 232) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
241. Id. (quoting Johnson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 232) (internal quotation marks omitted).
242. 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 5251, at **13-14.
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emiment agent who checked the solution did not testify. The court relied
on the fact that the "testing of the check solution . . .would have
occurred even in the absence of charges against [the defendant] to
ensure compliance with [the state statute concerning checks on breath-
testing instruments]. In other words, the [preparer of certificate] was not
a 'witness against the accused.' ,
243
The assertion in Williams and cases like it that a certificate of anal-
ysis does not "bear testimony" simply makes no sense. Testimony is
defined in Crawford as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact. '2'4  A certificate of
analysis is created to establish the fact that a substance analyzed is of a
certain character. It is hard to see how any court can honestly believe
that such is not testimony. The assertion that a certificate of analysis
does not "function as the equivalent of in-court testimony" is similarly
baseless. If not for the admission of the certificate, how are the results
of laboratory testing to be offered into evidence? Telepathy? 24  Of
course certificates of analysis and all laboratory reports function as the
equivalent of in-court testimony. If not for the report, the person who
ran the test would have to come into court and testify to the results.
Whether a report is created to comply with the requirements of a
legislative mandate is likewise irrelevant under Crawford. The check-
solution certificate in Shisler was not created to meet an ongoing emer-
gency. It was created to aid the government in prosecuting crimes.
Many courts using this "legislative mandate" approach rely on the fact
that the "primary purpose" of the report is to comply with a statute or
regulation.246 These courts conveniently ignore the fact that the "pri-
mary purpose" of the statute and the governmental agency's compliance
with it is to "establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution. '247  Though the check-solution certificate in
Shisler is not direct proof of a defendant's wrongdoing, it plays a vital
role in proving that the breath-test machine was operating properly when
the breath test was performed. The certificate is used to prove past
events directly relevant to a criminal prosecution i.e., the defendant's
243. Id. at **14; see also OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3701-53-04(A) (2007) ("Instrument check").
244. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (quoting WEBSTER, supra note 27)
(alteration in original). Davis essentially did away with any true solemnity requirement.
245. The author will refrain from extensive analysis of whether a telepathic communication
would be testimonial. Yet if it were given in response to police questioning, it seems the
communication would be testimonial.
246. See, e.g., People v. Hrubecky, No. 2006RI005491, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3859, at *5-6
(Crim. Ct. Dec. 13, 2006) ("[T]he 'primary purpose' of the certifications ... [was] to certify as to
the operation of equipment.").
247. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
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blood-alcohol level was above the legal limit. That a governmental
agency is required to check the solution is wholly irrelevant.
D. The Texts of Crawford and Davis
Crawford cited three "formulations" of the core class of testimonial
statements that "all share a common nucleus and then define the [Con-
frontation] Clause's coverage at various levels of abstraction around
it."'24 8 These formulations are:
1. "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is,
material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testi-
mony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be
used prosecutorially";
2. "extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or con-
fessions"; and
3. "statements that were made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial., 249
Crawford also provided a list of four situations that per se result in testi-
monial statements. The court stated that"[w]hatever else term [testimo-
nial] covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police
interrogations. 25 °
The holding in Davis was in reference to "interrogations" and was
intended to apply to "the narrow situations we address. '"251
1. THE THREE CRAWFORD FORMULATIONS
Some courts refer to the three formulations and determine that the
laboratory report in question is testimonial.252 Other courts reach the
248. 541 U.S. at 52.
249. Id. at 51-52 (ellipsis in original) (citations omitted).
250. Id. at 68.
251. 547 U.S. at 830 n.5.
252. See Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 12 (D.C. 2006) (DEA chemist report is
testimonial; "Under every definition of 'testimony' and 'testimonial' in Crawford, as well as the
'primary purpose' test employed in Davis, the DEA chemist's report in this case constituted a
'core' testimonial statement subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause."); State v.
Latumer, 163 P.3d 367, 376 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (citing the three Crawford formulations and
finding laboratory report to be testimonial; "The forensic scientist who prepared [the defendant's]
lab report was a witness; the statements in her lab report were testimony; and she knew when
preparing her report that it would be used by the State at [the defendant's] trial to prove he
committed the crime of possessing methamphetamine."); State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 309
(Minn. 2006) (Bureau of Criminal Apprehension ("BCA") lab report identifying substance as
cocaine is testimonial; "The BCA lab report bears characteristics of each of the three generic
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:839
exact opposite conclusion. 3 In Thomas v. United States, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals determined that the admission of a Drug
Enforcement Agency ("DEA") chemist's report determining a substance
to be cocaine without the testimony of the chemist who prepared the
report violated the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause.254
The court determined that "[u]nder every definition of . . . 'testimonial'
in Crawford . . .the DEA chemist's report in this case constituted a
'core' testimonial statement subject to the requirements of the Confron-
tation Clause. '2 5 In Commonwealth v. Williams, the defendant objected
to the admission of a certificate of analysis from the Virginia Depart-
ment of Forensic Science reporting the results of chemical testing.256
The forensic scientist who prepared the report did not testify. In over-
ruling the defendant's objection the court stated, "A certificate of analy-
sis is clearly different from the type of 'core' testimonial evidence
described in Crawford.' '257 How can two courts faced with essentially
the same set of facts take such diametrically opposite positions? The
descriptions offered by the Supreme Court in Crawford."); State v. Sickmann, No. A05-2478,
2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1329, at *6-8 (Ct. App. Dec.12, 2006) (quoting Crawford's
"three general categories of testimonial statements" and finding laboratory report to be
testimonial); State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Mo. 2007) (listing Crawford's "three useful
formulations of this core class of testimonial statements" and holding that "[u]nder the definitions
of testimony and testimonial in Crawford, as well as the primary purpose test in Davis, it is clear
that the laboratory report in this case constituted a core testimonial statement subject to the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause") (internal quotation marks omitted); State v.
Pasqualone, No. 2007-A-0005, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 5888, at *15 (Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2007)
("[L]aboratory reports such as the one admitted in this matter meet all three of the examples of a
testimonial statement given in Crawford."); State v. Reuschling, No. 2007-A-0006, 2007 Ohio
App. LEXIS 5895, at **14 (Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2007) ("[L]aboratory reports such as the one
admitted in this matter meet all three of the examples of a testimonial statement given in
Crawford."); Deener v. State, 214 S.W.3d 522, 526 (Tex. App. 2006) (certificate of analysis and
chain of custody affidavits are testimonial; "We conclude the affidavits and certificate at issue fall
squarely within all three [Crawford formulations] and are thus 'testimonial' within the meaning of
the analysis set forth in Crawford.").
253. See Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 838 (Md. 2006) (concluding that the autopsy report as
redacted is nontestimonial because the report does not fall under the "core class of 'testimonial'
statements"); Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 706 (Mass. 2005) (drug certificate
stating results of analysis is nontestimonial; "The documentary evidence at issue here has very
little kinship to the type of hearsay the confrontation clause intended to exclude, absent an
opportunity for cross-examination."); State v. Norman, 125 P.3d 15, 18 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)
(breath-test-machine certifications are nontestimonial; "[T]he certifications in this case do not
resemble the classic kind of testimonial evidence at which the Confrontation Clause was aimed
.... ); Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 04-451, 2005 WL 3007781, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 10,
2005) (certificate of analysis from the Virginia Department of Forensic Science is nontestimonial;
"A certificate of analysis is clearly different from the type of 'core' testimonial evidence described
by Crawford.").
254. 914 A.2d at 12.
255. Id.
256. 2005 WL 3007781, at *1.
257. Id. at *3.
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answer lies in the "miasma of uncertainty" created by Crawford. There
is no "right" answer to whether the laboratory reports are testimonial; at
best there are more or less reasonable guesses.
Still other courts look to the three formulations, assert they are dic-
tum or merely proposed, and refuse to rely on them.258 At least when
Crawford applies to witness statements to law enforcement, any focus
on the declarant's belief is improper.2 5 9 So courts stating that the formu-
lations (or at least two of the three) are dicta are seemingly correct. But
because intra-governmental laboratory reports do not fit within the hold-
ing of Crawford, perhaps looking to the formulations is a reasonable
approach. One thing is clear-the formulations have created more con-
fusion than clarity. Courts that rely on them and those that do not reach
contradictory results. Those courts treating them as dicta are forced to
look elsewhere to justify their decision and the justifications are often no
more "correct" than ones based on the formulations.
2. THE FOUR NECESSARILY TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS
A great number of courts refer to the four per se testimonial state-
ments set forth in Crawford and determine that laboratory reports are
nontestimonial because laboratory reports are not akin to the four state-
ments.26° In Moreno Denoso v. State, the defendant was convicted of
258. See People v. Kim, 859 N.E.2d 92, 94 (I11. App. Ct. 2006) (breath-test-machine
certification is nontestimonial; "[W]hether a document may be used in litigation... [i]s but one of
several considerations that Crawford identified as bearing on whether evidence is testimonial.
None of the factors was deemed dispositive."); State v. Carter, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 (Mont. 2005)
(breath-test-machine certification is nontestimonial; "Crawford also mentioned the . . .
formulations .... However, Crawford did not adopt any of the.., definitions .... "); City of Las
Vegas v. Walsh, 124 P.3d 203, 208 (Nev. 2005) (nurse's affidavit offered to prove certain facts
relating to the withdrawal of blood for testing is testimonial; reviewing the three formulations and
stating "we conclude the affidavits . . . are testimonial statements"); People v. Fisher, No. 04-
1556, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2409, at **16 (City Ct. Oct. 25, 2005) ("breath test documents,"
including calibration certificate and certification of analysis of stimulator solution, are
nontestimonial; "While the Court recognized several analytical models, it is important to
remember that the Court did not endorse any one of them."); Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 618
S.E.2d 347, 354 n.4 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (breath-test certificate including attestation machine in
good working order is nontestimonial; "Because the Supreme Court did not expressly adopt any of
the[ ] formulations or use them in its analysis, we decline to rely on them here.").
259. See Graham, Special Report, supra note 4.
260. See People v. Hinojos-Mendoza, 140 P.3d 30, 37 (Colo. App. 2005) (laboratory report
showing substance to be cocaine is nontestimonial; "[The report] does [not] resemble the other
types of statements identified by the Crawford majority as testimonial, such as 'prior testimony at
a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial.' It is not a statement obtained from
a witness during a 'police interrogation."'), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 169 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2007);
Pflieger v. State, 952 So. 2d 1251, 1252 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (breathalyzer certification
is nontestimonial; "None of these [four necessarily testimonial statements] apply in this case.");
Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (breath-test-machine certification is
nontestimonial; "[I]nspection and operator certifications are simply not included in the class of
evidence ... identified by the Crawford court .... "); Rembusch v. State, 836 N.E.2d 979, 982
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murder. 261 A certified copy of the victim's autopsy report that had been
prepared by a state medical examiner was admitted at trial as a public
record.262 On appeal the defendant argued that admission of the autopsy
report violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause because the
pathologist who prepared the report did not testify.263 Despite the fact
that the report set forth both factual findings and the cause of death, the
court found it to be nontestimonial. 264 Quoting the four necessarily tes-
timonial statements listed in Crawford,2 65 the court held that "the
autopsy report in this case does not fall within the categories of testimo-
nial evidence described in Crawford.' 266
It is true that laboratory reports do not resemble the four testimo-
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (breath-test-machine certification is nontestimonial; "[W]e do not believe
that the admission of a certificate of inspection and compliance of a breath test instrument belong
to that class of evidence involving [the four per se testimonial statements] that the Crawford court
identified ...."); State v. Arita, 900 So. 2d 37, 45 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (latent fingerprint card is
nontestimonial; listing the four testimonial statements in Crawford; "The evidence at issue here
... was clearly non-testimonial hearsay evidence."); State v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (N.M.
2004) (blood-alcohol test report is nontestimonial; "[A] blood alcohol report is very different from
the other examples of testimonial hearsay evidence ...."); State v. Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137, 143
(N.C. 2006) (DNA laboratory report is nontestimonial; "They do not fall into any of the categories
that the Supreme Court defined as unquestionably testimonial."); Vill. of Granville v. Eastman,
No. 2006CA00050, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6213, at **9 (Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2006) (breath-test-
machine certification is nontestimonial; "[T]hey bear no similarities to the types of evidence the
Supreme Court labeled as testimonial: [listing the four testimonial statements].") (quoting State v.
Cook, No. WD-04-029, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 1514, at **8) (Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted); State v. Greene, No. CA2005-12-129, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6053, at
**6 (Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2006) (same); Cook, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 1514, at **8 (breath-
machine-certification documents and officer certification are nontestimonial; "[Tlhey bear no
similarities to the types of evidence the Supreme Court labeled as testimonial: [listing the four
testimonial statements.]"); State v. Thackaberry, 95 P.3d 1142, 1145 (Or. Ct. App. 2004)
(laboratory report showing presence of methamphetamine in defendant's urine is likely
nontestimonial because it is not analogous to the four statements listed in Crawford); In re
J.R.L.G., No. 11-05-00002-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 3344, at *6-7 (App. Apr. 27, 2006)
(holding laboratory report showing the result of a drug test is nontestimonial because it is not akin
to the four testimonial statements listed in Crawford); Moreno Denoso v. State, 156 S.W.3d 166,
182 (Tex. App. 2005) (autopsy report is nontestimonial; "[T]he autopsy report in this case does
not fall within the categories of testimonial evidence described in Crawford. It is not prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial. It is not a statement
given in response to police interrogations.") (citation omitted); Mitchell v. State, 191 S.W.3d 219,
222 (Tex. App. 2005) ("[B]ecause the autopsy report does not fall within the categories of
testimonial evidence described in Crawford, we hold that it is nontestimonial."); Luginbyhl, 618
S.E.2d at 354 (certificate of blood-alcohol analysis is nontestimonial; "[The nontestifying
officer's] statements in the affidavit do not resemble the types of statements identified by the
Supreme Court as testimonial.").
261. 156 S.w.3d at 172.
262. Id. at 180.
263. Id. at 180-81.
264. Id. at 182.
265. Id. at 181.
266. Id. at 182.
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nial statements listed in Crawford. This fact alone, however, is not
enough to justify treating a laboratory report as nontestimonial. First,
simply because the statements in Crawford are necessarily testimonial
does not mean they are necessarily the only testimonial statements. The
Court prefaced the list with "[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies
at a minimum to . . ."267 implying that "testimonial" may include state-
ments other than those listed.268 Whether laboratory reports are
included in "whatever else" is unclear. Second, focus on the four testi-
monial statements ad seriatim has a tendency to lose sight of the forest
by focusing on the trees. The Confrontation Clause under Crawford is
concerned with "government conduct in acquiring evidence against the
accused.'269 Therefore, one can reasonably argue that the "trees" i.e.,
"prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a
former trial; and ...police interrogations" are only part of a broader
forest, i.e., the overarching concern in Crawford.
3. THE EFFECT OF DAVIS ON LABORATORY REPORTS
Some courts have found laboratory reports to be testimonial in light
of Davis, 270 and others have reached the opposite conclusion.2 7' Still
other courts reviewing laboratory reports following Davis make no men-
tion of the case.272 At least one court has stated that Davis is of no help
267. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
268. See Johnson v. State, 929 So. 2d 4, 7, 8-9 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005) ("[Crawford] did
provide a noncomprehensive list of testimony that would be considered testimonial: [listing the
four testimonial statements].") (certifying question: "Does the admission of a Florida Department
of Law Enforcement lab report establishing the illegal nature of substances possessed by a
defendant violate the Confrontation Clause and Crawford v. Washington, when the person who
performed the lab test did not testify?") (citation omitted), certifying question to 924 So. 2d. 810
(Fla. 2006).
269. Graham, Special Report, supra note 4, at 108.
270. See Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 12 (D.C. 2006) (DEA chemists report is
testimonial; "Under ... the 'primary purpose' test employed in Davis, the DEA chemist's report
in this case constituted a 'core' testimonial statement subject to the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause."); State v. Miller, 144 P.3d 1052, 1058 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (laboratory
reports prepared by Oregon State Police Forensic Laboratory are testimonial in light of Davis;
"We can "presume ... that the reports were, in fact, produced in response to a police inquiry.").
271. See, e.g., People v. Hrubecky, No. 2006RI005491, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3859, at *5--6
(Crim. Ct. Dec. 13, 2006) (breath-test-machine certification documents are nontestimonial; "[Tihe
'primary purpose' of the certifications, which were in compliance with [the state statutes], was not
to offer testimony against the defendant, but to certify as to the operation of equipment.").
272. See Pruitt v. State, 954 So. 2d 611 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (certificate of analysis is
nontestimonial; no mention of Davis); Sobota v. State, 933 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2006) (laboratory report showing result of blood test is testimonial; no mention of Davis); Martin
v. State, 936 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (laboratory report showing result of
substance analysis is testimonial; no mention of Davis); People v. Lebrecht, 823 N.Y.S.2d 824
(App. Term 2006) (breath-test-machine certification is nontestimonial; no mention of Davis);
Deener v. State, 214 S.W.3d 522 (Tex. App. 2006) (certificate of analysis is testimonial; no
mention of Davis).
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in analyzing laboratory reports.2 73 Davis contained a narrow holding, so
the assertion that the case is of no assistance in analyzing laboratory
reports is certainly reasonable. But given that neither of the two cases
setting forth the "new" (or traditional, according to the Court) meaning
of the Confrontation Clause adequately deals with laboratory reports,
looking to Davis by analogy is also a reasonable approach.
In State v. Miller, the Court of Appeals of Oregon agreed with the
lower court that "two lab reports prepared by employees of the Oregon
State Police Forensic Laboratory (OSP lab) that the state wished to
introduce into evidence without calling the authors ... as witnesses" 274
were "inadmissible without the live testimony of the forensic scientists,
or criminalist or analyst who prepared the reports. '2 75 The court deter-
mined that the reports were testimonial "in the light of the Court's recent
decision elaborating on Crawford' noting that "Davis/Hammon pro-
vided additional guidance. '"276 Referring to the "primary purpose" test,
the court stated, "[t]he statements made in the lab reports at issue here
are clearly intended to be used in a criminal prosecution to prove past
events-the presence of controlled substance in the defendant's urine at
a specific time in the past and the presence of drug residue on the glass
smoking device. '"277 The court described the reports as "solemn declara-
tions or affirmations of fact, made to the police department that
requested the results. '278 Thus the court ignored the fact that the report
was made by "the government" for "the government." This distinction
is important. Nothing in Crawford or Davis mandates that statements
made within the government are to be subject to the same scrutiny as
those coming from outside the government. Yet nothing says they are to
be treated any differently.279
4. CONTEMPORANEOUS RECORDATION OF OBSERVABLE EVENTS
Focusing on the circumstances under which a statement is made,
some courts have distinguished between statements about past events
and statements made while an event is perceived, judging only the for-
273. See Jarrell v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1022, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (breath-test-machine
certification report is nontestimonial; "It appears to us that Davis/Hammon is of little or no
assistance in deciding the case before us. Those cases were highly fact-specific and generated a
rule related to a precise, but frequently recurring, scenario .... ").
274. 144 P.3d at 1053. One of the authors of the reports had left the OSP laboratory and the
other had not been subpoenaed for the day in question. Id.
275. Id. at 1054 (internal quotation marks omitted).
276. Id. at 1058.
277. Id.
278. Id. (emphasis added).
279. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. An analysis of this quagmire results in the "worse-er"
conundrum.
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mer to be testimonial. As such, these courts find laboratory reports to be
nontestimonial contemporaneous recordations of observable events.28°
In People v. Geier, the defendant was convicted of murder, rape, and
conspiracy to murder.28" ' At trial a DNA expert from a state-contracted
private laboratory testified for the prosecution that DNA found on the
victim matched the defendant's. The in-court expert, however, based
her opinion on the DNA report of a nontestifying analyst from the same
laboratory. At trial, the defendant argued that the test results were inad-
missible unless the analyst who actually performed the tests testified.
Overruling the objection, the trial court allowed the expert's testimony.
On appeal the defendant argued that admission of the expert's testimony
violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause because the DNA
report was testimonial.282 The California Supreme Court began its anal-
ysis with an overview of the various rationales offered by other courts in
determining whether laboratory reports are testimonial. Though the
court "found no single analysis of the applicability of Crawford and
Davis to the kind of scientific evidence at issue in this case to be entirely
persuasive," the court, based on its own interpretation of Crawford and
Davis, was "nonetheless more persuaded by those cases concluding that
such evidence is not testimonial. ' 283 The court held that:
For our purposes in this case, involving the admission of a DNA
report, what we extract from those decisions is that a statement is
testimonial if (1) it is made to a law enforcement officer or by or to a
law enforcement agent and (2) describes a past fact related to crimi-
nal activity for (3) possible use at a later trial. Conversely, a state-
ment that does not meet all three criteria is not testimonial.284
Interpreting Davis, the court stated that while the possibility of use at a
later trial is one consideration in determining whether a statement is tes-
280. See People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 139 (Cal. 2007) (DNA report is nontestimonial
because the nontestifying author's observations as recorded in the report "constitute a
contemporaneous recordation of observable events rather than the documentation of past events");
In re D.H., No. A 116095, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8214, at *10 (Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2007)
(laboratory report is nontestimonial; "The [Geier] court identified the 'crucial point' as 'whether
the statement represents the contemporaneous recordation of observable events,' and evidence is
not testimonial just because it might be reasonably anticipated that it would be used at trial.");
State v. O'Maley, 932 A.2d 1, 12 (N.H. 2007) (blood-sample-collection form and blood-test result
are nontestimonial; "[A] crucial factor in determining whether a statement is testimonial or not is
whether it represents 'the documentation of past events' or 'the contemporaneous recordation of
observable events.") (quoting Geier, 161 P.3d at 139); State v. Crager, 879 N.E.2d 745, 756 (Ohio
2007) (DNA report is nontestimonial; "[T]he [testimonial] inquiry actually should focus on
'whether the statement represents the contemporaneous recordation of observable events.'")
(quoting Geier, 161 P.3d at 140).
281. 161 P.3dat 110.
282. Id. at 134.
283. Id. at 138.
284. Id. at 138-39.
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timonial, "the proper focus [in determining whether an out-of-court
statement is testimonial] is not on the mere reasonable chance that an
out-of-court statement might be used in a criminal trial. 285 The court
determined that the distinction made in Davis between testimonial and
nontestimonial statements was based on the circumstances under which
Michelle McCrotty's and Amy Hammon's respective statements were
made.286 McCrotty's statement, the court noted, was "a contemporane-
ous description of an unfolding event, ' 287 and therefore nontestimonial.
Conversely, Hammon's statement was in response to police questioning
and its purpose was to "deliberately recount[ ], in response to police
questioning, how potentially criminal past events began and
progressed. ' 288 Thus, the statement was testimonial. The court noted
that the police, as part of an investigation, requested the nontestifying
analyst's statements contained in the DNA report and the analyst could
reasonably have anticipated that the report might be used in a later crim-
inal prosecution.289 The court stated, however, that the analyst's "obser-
vations . . . constitute a contemporaneous recordation of observable
events rather than the documentation of past events. '290 The analyst
recoded her observations "regarding the receipt of the DNA samples, her
preparation of the samples for analysis, and the results of that analysis as
she was actually performing those tasks."'29' As such, the statements
made by the analyst and recorded in the DNA report were akin to the
statements of Michelle McCrotty in Davis and thus nontestimonial.
It is not clear that the Geier court's reasoning by analogy is at all
appropriate given the contextual differences between the creation of lab-
oratory reports and statements made in response to police interrogations.
While it is true that Davis found the circumstances under which state-
ments are made to be relevant in determining whether a statement is
testimonial, the Court hardly sanctioned an approach that may well
deem all present-sense impressions to be nontestimonial. While consid-
285. Id. at 139 (alteration in original) (emphasis added); see also id. ("United States v. Ellis, [ ]
460 F.3d [920,] 926 [(7th Cir. 2006)] ["A reasonable person reporting a domestic disturbance,
which is what [Michelle McCrotty] in Davis was doing, will be aware that the result is the arrest
and possible prosecution of the perpetrator. So it cannot be that a statement is testimonial in every
case where a declarant reasonably expects that it might be used prosecutorially"].)) (alterations in
original) (citation omitted). This interpretation of Davis, however, improperly focuses on the
reasonable expectations of the declarant. The proper inquiry (at least in the context of an
interrogation) is whether law enforcement's purpose is to meet an ongoing emergency or to gather
evidence for a possible prosecution in the future.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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ering the circumstances in which a statement is made, courts relying on
the contemporaneous recordation-of-observable-events rationale wholly
disregard a key circumstance clearly relevant in Davis-emergency. In
Davis, the Court held that a statement is nontestimonial "when made in
the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indi-
cating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. 292 Statements are testimo-
nial when "the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is
to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution. ' 293 Thus, it is clear that if there is an emergency and the
police purpose in receiving a statement is to meet it, such circumstances
are sufficient to create a nontestimonial statement. It is not clear
whether and when statements falling outside such circumstances are tes-
timonial. Clearly, if a statement is made under circumstances where
there is no emergency and the primary purpose of an interrogation is to
establish past events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution,
the statement will be testimonial. Nothing in Davis, however, indicates
that merely because an event is contemporaneously recorded it will be
nontestimonial. The temporal focus of Davis is inextricably tied to the
contemporaneousness of the statement and the ongoing emergency, not
merely any event perceived. Further, if the nontestifying expert is
treated as analytically distinct from the law-enforcement agent request-
ing a laboratory report, it seems incorrect to focus on whether the labo-
ratory report itself "describes a past fact related to criminal activity." '2 94
True, the laboratory report contains a record of events-for example, a
lab test shows a substance is cocaine-recorded as they were contempo-
raneously observed. But Davis deems statements to be testimonial when
the "primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. 2 95 If the
request by the law-enforcement agent is analogized to an "interrogation"
it seems that the pertinent inquiry is into the agent's purpose in request-
ing that the laboratory report be created. The agent's purpose in "inter-
rogating" the analyst is to prove that the substance to be tested is, and
was in the past, cocaine.
On the opposite end of the spectrum from Geier, the court in State
v. Kent found both a laboratory report prepared by a New Jersey State
Police chemist and a blood-test certificate prepared pursuant to a state
292. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (emphasis added).
293. Id. at 822 (emphasis added).
294. Geier, 161 P.3d at 138.
295. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (emphasis added).
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statute by a hospital employee to be testimonial.296 Relying on Davis,
the court found that the documents had been admitted into evidence dur-
ing the defendant's trial for driving while intoxicated in violation of the
Confrontation Clause. The court found that when the police chemist
analyzed the defendant's blood there was "no ongoing emergency. 297
Further, it could not reasonably be argued "that the 'primary purpose' of
the lab certificate was anything other than to prove past events, specifi-
cally defendant's blood alcohol concentration, relevant to his DWI pros-
ecution. '298 As to the blood-test certificate the court held that "the
'primary purpose' of the blood certificate was surely to preserve evi-
dence for a future anticipated DWI prosecution. '2 99 Noting that hospital
nurses are not police officers, the court stated that "their close interac-
tion with law enforcement officers, in extracting blood from DWI sus-
pects and in certifying as to 'the manner and circumstances under which
the sample was taken,' readily places them within the ambit of the 'testi-
monial' boundaries of Crawford."3"
While Kent appears to be more consistent with Davis than Geier, it
is far from clear that Davis, with its self-proclaimed narrow focus on
police interrogations, should be applied by analogy to laboratory reports.
In Davis, the Court prefaced the "primary purpose test" by stating,
"[w]ithout attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all con-
ceivable statements-or even all conceivable statements in response to
police interrogation-as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices
to decide the present cases to hold as follows." '' Thus, laboratory
reports may well fall into a yet-to-be-explicated category of nontestimo-
nial statements. Unfortunately for courts and litigants alike, Crawford
and Davis offer little guidance in divining the contours of such a
category.
5. FOCUS ON THE DECLARANT
Based on the text of Crawford, a number of courts focus on the
declarant's state of mind or reasonable belief in analyzing laboratory
reports under Crawford.3 °2 In People v. Lonsby, a Michigan State Police
296. 918 A.2d 626, 628 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2007); see also State v. Renshaw, 915 A.2d
1081, 1088 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2007) (holding that a blood-test certificate is testimonial).
297. 918 A.2d at 637 (internal quotation marks omitted).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 638 (citation omitted).
301. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (emphasis added).
302. See Commonwealth v. Lampron, 839 N.E.2d 870, 875 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (result of
drug screen created by hospital is nontestimonial; "The proper inquiry is whether a reasonable
person in the declarant's position would anticipate the statement's being used against the accused
in investigating and prosecuting a crime.") (quoting Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d
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Crime Laboratories serologist tested a stain and "recorded her observa-
tions and test results in laboratory notes and a lab report. ' 3°3 The serolo-
gist who performed the test did not testify at trial; instead, another
serologist from the laboratory testified about the content of the written
statements. The Court of Appeals of Michigan held that "the nontestify-
ing serologist's notes and lab report constitute testimonial hearsay and
• ..the admission of these statements through [the other serologist's]
testimony violated defendant's rights under the Confrontation
Clause. ''3°  The court based this conclusion on the fact that the writings
"clearly qualify as statements that [the nontestifying serologist] would
reasonably expect would be used in a prosecutorial manner."3 5 This
approach is improper under Crawford, at least when the case is applied
to situations it was explicitly designed to cover. But that two of the
three formulations of testimonial focus on the declarant has created a
great deal of confusion. Although it is far from clear on a cursory read-
ing, but "consistent with the two historical inferences"306 in Crawford,
the Confrontation Clause focuses "solely upon government conduct in
acquiring evidence against the accused."30 7 In other words, under Craw-
ford-as clarified by Davis-the "reasonable" expectations of the
declarant simply cannot be a relevant factor. As has been repeatedly
stated, however, it is not clear whether this or any theory of Crawford or
Davis applies when the "declarant" is the government and the "state-
ment" a laboratory report.
549, 558 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted); People v. Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d 610, 612
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (serologist report from the Michigan State Police Crime Laboratories is
nontestimonial; "[P]retrial statements are testimonial if the declarant would reasonably expect that
the statement will be used in a prosecutorial manner and if the statement is made 'under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial[.]' ") (second alteration in original); People v. Orpin, 796
N.Y.S.2d 512, 515 (Just. Ct. 2005) (inspection, maintenance, and calibration records of breath-test
machine prepared by state division of criminal justice and certification of analysis of stimulator
solution prepared by state police forensic investigation center are testimonial; "What these [three
Crawford] formulations all share is that the declarant understand that his or her statement will be
used in a criminal investigation or prosecution."), rev'd sub. nom. Green v. DeMarco, 812
N.Y.S.2d 722 (Sup. Ct. 2005); State v. Shelly, 627 S.E.2d 287, 299 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (gunshot
residue testing report is nontestimonial; "Based on a comprehensive survey of other jurisdictions
... testimonial statements share a common characteristic: The declarant's knowledge, expectation,
or intent that his or her statements will be used at a subsequent trial.") (internal quotation marks
omitted); Vill. of Granville v. Graziano, 139 Ohio Misc. 2d 29, 35 (Licking County Mun. Ct.
2006) (breath-test-machine certifications are testimonial; "[They] were made under circumstances
which would lead the declarant to believe that the statements would be available for use at a later
trial.").
303. 707 N.W.2d at 613.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 619.
306. Graham, The Davis Narrowing, supra note 56, at 610.
307. Graham, Special Report, supra note 4, at 108.
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E. Practical Considerations and Outlier Cases
In describing the Framer's objections to the admission of Cobham's
statement into evidence, the Court in Crawford stated that "the problem
was that the judges refused to allow Raleigh to confront Cobham in
court, where he could cross-examine him and try to expose his accusa-
tions as a lie."3°8 Accordingly, "[t]estimonial statements of witnesses
absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavail-
able, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine. '  Thus, the sine qua non for admissibility of testimonial
statements is "testing in the crucible of cross-examination."'3 10
1. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A number of courts stress the practical ramifications of finding lab-
oratory reports testimonial in order to bolster their rationale for finding
reports to be nontestimonial.3 11 In People v. Durio, the court found to
be nontestimonial an autopsy report created by a medical examiner
employed by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner.312 The report
was admitted into evidence without the testimony of the medical exam-
iner who prepared the report. The court concluded its analysis with the
statement:
[C]ourts cannot ignore the practical implications that would follow
from treating autopsy reports as inadmissible testimonial hearsay in a
homicide case. Years may pass between the performance of the
autopsy and the apprehension of the perpetrator. This passage of
308. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
309. Id. at 59.
310. Id. at 61.
311. See Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (breath-test-machine
certification is nontestimonial; "[Tihe unreasonable alternative is to have a toxicologist in every
court on a daily basis offering testimony about his inspection of a breathalyzer machine .... ");
State v. Lackey, 120 P.3d 332, 351 (Kan. 2005) (autopsy report is nontestimonial; "If, as in this
case, the medical examiner is deceased or otherwise unavailable, the State would be precluded
from using the autopsy report in presenting its case, which could preclude the prosecution of a
homicide case."), overruled on other grounds by State v. Davis, 158 P.3d 317 (Kan. 2006);
Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 845 (Md. 2006) (autopsy report nontestimonial; "[W]e note the
impractical implications to classifying autopsy reports as inadmissible testimonial hearsay because
the person who prepared them is not present to testify."); People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 869
(Sup. Ct. 2005) (autopsy report is nontestimonial; "[C]ourts cannot ignore the practical
implications that would follow from treating autopsy reports as inadmissible testimonial hearsay
in a homicide case."); State v. Crager, 879 N.E.2d 745, 758 (Ohio 2007) (reversing lower court
and finding DNA report to be nontestimonial; "As a final matter, the practical results of affirming
the judgment of the court of appeals in this case would be problematical."). But see State v. Kent,
918 A.2d 626, 640 (N.J. Super Ct. App. 2007) ("Although we surely appreciate the practical
quandaries created by post-Crawford jurisprudence, we are unpersuaded that the ... laboratory
reports and the blood sample certificate ... were non-testimonial ... .
312. 794 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
[Vol. 62:839
2008]LABORATORY REPORTS UNDER CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 905
time can easily lead to the unavailability of the examiner who pre-
pared the autopsy report.3 13
The court's concerns are certainly justified. The practical ramifications
of treating laboratory reports as testimonial are wide-ranging and signifi-
cant. But Crawford is not practical. If hearsay is testimonial, it must be
tested "in the crucible of cross-examinations." There are no exceptions.
There must be cross-examination regardless of how impractical subject-
ing the testimonial statement to cross-examination may be. Courts not-
ing the extreme difficulties created if laboratory reports are found to be
testimonial, though observant, are incorrect in using such hardship to
justify their decisions determining laboratory reports to be
nontestimonial.
2. OUTLIER CASES
A few cases do not fall within the above-mentioned categories. In
State v. Berezansky, a laboratory certificate created by a state police lab-
oratory indicating the defendant's blood-alcohol level to have been
above the legal limit was admitted into evidence as a business record.314
The technician who prepared the report did not testify. In finding the
defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated, the
court stated, "[w]e need not fill in the definition left open by the
Supreme Court to be guided by the Court's concerns for the right of
confrontation as expressed in Crawford.' 315 The court never decided
whether the certificate was testimonial. Instead, the court relied on a
New Jersey Supreme Court case from 2002 in light of Crawford and
determined that the "defendant ... was denied his constitutional right to
confront the certificates preparer. '31 6 The merit of this approach is that
the court seems to stay in line with the spirit of Crawford while avoiding
reliance on individual portions of the Crawford text3 17 that clearly do
not provide adequate guidance in the analysis of laboratory reports under
the Confrontation Clause.
Similarly, in State v. Birchfield, the Supreme Court of Oregon held
that admission into evidence of a laboratory report without requiring the
state to produce the criminalist who prepared the report or demonstrate
that the criminalist was unavailable violated the Confrontation Clause of
313. Id.
314. 899 A.2d 306, 308 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).
315. Id. at 310.
316. Id. at 312 (citing State v. Simbara, 811 A.2d 448 (N.J. 2002)); see also State v. Renshaw,
915 A.2d 1081, 1087-88 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (discussing Berezansky and explicitly
finding a certificate of blood analysis to be testimonial in light of Davis).
317. Such as the business-records reference, see supra Part A, the three formulations, see
supra Part DI, the four testimonial statements, see supra Part D.2, etc.
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the Oregon Constitution. 31 8 Thus, the court avoided the necessity of
descending into the uncertainty surrounding Crawford.
At least one court, albeit subsequently reversed, was willing to
admit that Crawford does not adequately answer whether laboratory
reports are testimonial. In State v. March, the lower court admitted a
crime laboratory report into evidence as a business record though the
testimony of the custodian of the laboratory's records.319 In response to
a Crawford challenge on appeal, the court held that "in a case such as
this, in which the Supreme Court has expressly refused to define what
constitutes 'testimonial,' we must recognize . . . Missouri cases as con-
trolling."32 The court found that under existing Missouri precedent,
admission of the laboratory report into evidence as a business record did
not violate the Confrontation Clause. While this approach may seem
like an easy way out of analyzing whether laboratory reports are testi-
monial, it is certainly honest. As has been asserted repeatedly through-
out this article, Crawford does not provide a clear answer to whether
laboratory reports are testimonial. Admittedly, it seems that under the
Supreme Court's rationale laboratory reports should be testimonial.
That it seems, however, that laboratory reports should be testimonial is
hardly an adequate justification for an answer to a question of such far-
reaching import.
V. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
Under Crawford and Davis it is not certain whether government-
created laboratory reports are testimonial hearsay when offered against a
criminal defendant. A few of the rationales used by courts in deciding
whether laboratory reports are testimonial seem to find some support in
Crawford and Davis. But some support is the extent to which any sup-
port can be found. This article has listed over twenty different rationales
offered by state courts to support their determinations whether labora-
tory reports are testimonial. Many courts use a great number of these
rationales to justify their decision. Courts seem to feel the need to
excuse their decisions by setting forth as many rationales as possible.
The need to write opinions that in essence say, "Look at all this. I must
be right. Right?" is a manifestation of the lack of clarity in Crawford
and Davis. One needs only to look to the courts of the State of Florida
to see the confusion created by laboratory reports. Three cases from the
318. 157 P.3d 216, 220 (Or. 2007); see also OR. CONST. art I, § 11 ("In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right ... to meet the witnesses face to face.")
319. State v. March, No. 27102, 2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 998, at *4 (Ct. App. June 30, 2006),
rev'd, 216 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Mo. 2007) (holding that the laboratory report constituted testimonial
evidence).
320. Id. at *13.
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Second District Court of Appeal and one from the Fourth District Court
of Appeal have all found laboratory reports to be testimonial and have
then certified questions "of great public importance" to the Florida
Supreme Court regarding whether their decisions are correct.12 ' These
courts, along with courts all over the country, are desperate for an
answer. The sole cause of this despair is the "miasma of uncertainty"
created by Crawford.
A further manifestation of the lack of clarity in Crawford is the
disparate results courts reach on essentially the same facts. Nothing is a
clearer symptom of unsound and unclear jurisprudence than widely dis-
parate results in application. If some laboratory reports created by the
government are testimonial, all laboratory reports should be. It should
not matter whether the report in question is a certificate of analysis,
breath-test-machine certification, or so forth. Yet courts are sharply
divided based on the specific type of report as well as laboratory reports
in general. For example, in Ohio one appellate court determined that
breath-test-machine certifications are nontestimonial while another
found a DNA analysis report to be testimonial.3 22 In Oregon, the court
of appeals found laboratory reports showing a substance to be contra-
band to be testimonial but breath-test-machine certifications to be non-
testimonial.31 3  There is no valid reason under Crawford for such
distinctions, but again Crawford is not clear whether laboratory reports
are testimonial in general. If they are, however, the distinctions between
321. See Johnson v. State, 929 So. 2d 4, 8-9 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App 2005) (certifying question:
"Does the admission of a Florida Department of Law Enforcement lab report establishing the
illegal nature of substances possessed by a defendant violate the Confrontation Clause and
Crawford v. Washington, when the person who performed the lab test did not testify?") (citation
omitted), certifying question to 924 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2006); Sobato v. State, 933 So. 2d 1277, 1279
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (certifying question: "Does admission of a test result from a legal
blood draw violate the Confrontation Clause and Crawford v. Washington, when the toxicologist
who performed the blood test does not testify?") (citation omitted); Williams v. State, 933 So. 2d
1283, 1285 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (certifying question: "Does admission of a breath test
affidavit violate the Confrontation Clause and Crawford v. Washington, when the technician who
performed breath test does not testify?") (citation omitted); Belvin v. State, 922 So. 2d 1046, 1054
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (certifying question: "Does admission of those portions of the breath
test affidavit pertaining to the breath test operator's procedures and observations in administering
the breath test constitute testimonial evidence and violate the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause in light of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Crawford v. Washington?")
(citation omitted).
322. Compare State v. Greene, No. CA2005-12-129, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6053, at *8 (Ct.
App. Nov. 20, 2006) (solution-batch certificate for breath-test machine is nontestimonial), with
State v. Crager, 844 N.E.2d 390, 397 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (DNA report is testimonial), overruled
by 879 N.E.2d 745 (Ohio 2007).
323. Compare State v. Miller, 144 P.3d 1052, 1058 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (laboratory report
showing a substance to be methamphetamine is testimonial), with State v. Norman, 125 P.3d 15,
19 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (certificates of accuracy of breath-test machine are nontestimonial).
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certain types of reports made by many courts are incorrect if Crawford
and Davis are to be applied logically.
Finally, courts finding laboratory reports to be testimonial appear to
be more correct. Yet at the same time these courts are generally far
more uncomfortable with their decision. The fear in Crawford is of gov-
ernmental overreaching and abuse. If an electronically recorded excited
utterance to the police made by a nongovernment witness is testimonial
then it certainly seems that laboratory reports created within the govern-
ment for use in the prosecution of criminal activity should be as well.
But under this "worse-er" logic admissions of a party opponent made to
the police by a criminal defendant should also be testimonial, but they
are not. Thus, while Crawford seems to imply that laboratory reports
are testimonial, there is simply no clear answer. The discomfort felt by
courts finding laboratory reports to be testimonial is due to the severe
effect such a finding has on the criminal-justice system. If, for example,
autopsy reports are testimonial, the preparing medical examiner must
come to trial and testify. If not, the report is inadmissible and this may
at times have a preclusive effect on homicide prosecutions. The same
goes for all laboratory reports. Given the realities of turnover in govern-
mental laboratories, the cost of bringing the person who ran the test to
court, complications such as death of the person who ran the test, and
other things, in comparison to what is often only a minimal value to the
defendant in having an opportunity to cross-examine the preparer of the
report, it is understandable why courts are uncomfortable. At the same
time, in many situations it is reasonable to require the preparer of the
report to be subject to cross-examination. The problem with Crawford
is if laboratory reports are testimonial there is no room for judicial dis-
cretion in determining under which circumstances there is a need for
cross-examination and when there is not. Crawford is all or nothing-
either laboratory reports are testimonial or they are not.
So what can be done? One would think (or hope) that the Supreme
Court will eventually recognize the pandemonium surrounding labora-
tory reports and decide whether they are testimonial. This will be no
easy task. This author would recommend retreating from Crawford and
Davis altogether and returning to Roberts with an express qualification
that collateral inculpatory statements are not reliable, do not have partic-
ularized guarantees of trustworthiness, are not based in a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, and therefore can never be used against a criminal
defendant. This would afford courts the flexibility to deal with labora-
tory reports on a more case-specific basis while leaving the Confronta-
tion Clause to prevent abusive use of such reports. While desirable, this
is simply not likely to happen.
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If the Supreme Court deems laboratory reports to be testimonial the
toll on the criminal-justice system will be severe and in many circum-
stances unwarranted. If laboratory reports, however, are found to be
nontestimonial they will be outside the protections of the Confrontation
Clause.3 24 Leaving reports to the whim of state-evidence law creates a
great risk of under-protection of the rights of criminal defendants. Thus,
if laboratory reports are testimonial the state will be greatly and at times
unduly burdened, yet if they are nontestimonial criminal defendants may
be convicted on the basis of unreliable hearsay. Either way justice suf-
fers. Judging laboratory reports nontestimonial-the inconsistency with
the underlying theory of Crawford notwithstanding-and resurrecting
Roberts for nontestimonial statements is one possible (though likely log-
ically inconsistent) solution. Another is to create a third category of
hearsay statements that are nontestimonial yet subject to Confrontation
Clause analysis, and have this category encompass laboratory reports.
The problem, however, would be that the history of the Confrontation
Clause as relied on in Crawford does not provide for such a third cate-
gory and defining the contours of this category would be exceedingly
difficult. Professor Michael. H. Graham's quotation of Oliver and
Hardy is exceptionally appropriate: "Ollie, what a fine kettle of fish you
got us into. 325
Another possible approach in analyzing laboratory reports under
Crawford is to look to the principal evil the Confrontation Clause was
designed to address as reflected in Crawford and Davis. Professor Gra-
ham asserts that this evil "was and is government officials eliciting and
also receiving 'accusatory statements' from third parties.'326 Thus,
"[t]he confrontation clause is not concerned with an out of court state-
ment by a declarant not available to be cross-examined at trial asserting
only that a crime was committed, i.e., corpus delecti; the confrontation is
concerned solely with the 'identification' of the accused as having com-
mitted a crime. ' 327 This proposition is supported by the historical dis-
cussion provided in Crawford. In his examination before the privy
counsel and in his letter, Lord Cohbam did not merely assert that some-
one had committed the crime of treason.328 Instead, Cohbam implicated
an identified individual, Sir Walter Raleigh, as his accomplice in trea-
324. See Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1183 (2007) (noting "Crawford's elimination
of Confrontation Clause protection against the admission of unreliable out-of-court nontestimonial
statements").
325. Graham, The Davis Narrowing, supra note 56, at 621.
326. 4 GRAHAM, HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 802:2.2, at 123 (Supp. 2008).
327. Id. at 124.
328. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004).
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son. 3 29 Further, in Crawford Justice Scalia seemed to be motivated, at
least in part, by a desire once and for all to do away with the use of
collateral inculpatory statements.33 °  Such statements by definition
implicate an identified individual in criminal activity. Thus, an alleged
accomplice's statement, "John and I robbed Brian," offered in John's
robbery prosecution through the testimony of a police officer who
received the statement, would be testimonial. But Brian's statement, "I
was robbed," offered through the same officer would be nontestimonial.
Thus, one might reasonably argue:
[An] out of court statement is "testimonial" only when it is an accu-
sation of criminal conduct by an identified or identifiable accused
elicited or received by a government official under circumstances
objectively indicating at the time made the primary purpose to which
the statement will be used by the government is to establish or prove
past events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution of the
identified perpetrator.331
If this is the case, laboratory reports, it can be argued, are nontestimonial
in that they "do not themselves accuse an identified or identifiable per-
son of having committed a crime. 332 This, of course, is only one possi-
ble reading of Crawford and Davis. As has been consistently
demonstrated though out this article, it is impossible to construct a
wholly consistent theory of what statements are or are not testimonial
given the Supreme Court's lack of guidance.
Perhaps the best approach available to courts wishing to find that
the defendant has a right to cross-examine the preparer of laboratory
reports, without getting bogged down in the interminable quest of deter-
mining whether laboratory reports are testimonial, is to decide, as a mat-
ter of evidence law, that the reports are inadmissible. Courts believing
the reports are admissible without the preparer's testimony might use the
same tack, but it seems less viable given that Crawford leans toward
treating laboratory reports as testimonial. And ultimately, when faced
with a Confrontation Clause challenge by the defendant, courts will be
forced to decide whether the report is testimonial. In the end, however,
there is no best approach because Crawford does not provide one.
Speaking for the majority in Crawford, Justice Scalia stated that "the
unpardonable vice of the Roberts test ... is not its unpredictability. '333
329. Id. ("Lord Cobham, Raleigh's alleged accomplice, had implicated him in an examination
before the Privy Council and in a letter. At Raleigh's trial, these were read to the jury.")
(emphasis added).
330. See supra Part II.
331. 4 GRAHAM, HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 802:2.2, at 124 (Supp. 2008).
332. Id. at 127.
333. 541 U.S. at 63.
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The same cannot be said for Crawford. The unpredictability created by
Crawford's application to laboratory reports is an unpardonable vice.
The uncertainty and discord that Crawford created must not be allowed
to persist.
Many state statutes provide for the admissibility of laboratory
reports into evidence without the preparer's testimony, provided the
defendant does not exercise his right to have the preparer called to tes-
tify. 334 Even assuming, without commenting on, the constitutional
validity of such statutes, a problem arises when the person who prepared
the report is unavailable. In such a situation, if laboratory reports are
testimonial the report is inadmissible. One potential avenue of relief for
state courts would be for state legislatures to amend these statutes to add
a clause similar to Rule 804(b)(5), which was proposed but not adopted
by the Federal Rules of Evidence. 335  The amended statute would allow
the defendant to cross-examine the preparer of the report; if he were
unavailable the report would be admitted as the only available evidence.
Of course, if laboratory reports are testimonial this approach would be
unconstitutional. But statutes are afforded a strong presumption of con-
334. The description provided here is of the general scheme of such statutes. The statutes,
however, differ on the mechanics of the defendant's ability to call the preparer of the report.
These differences may have Constitutional implications. An example of such a statute is TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.41 (2007):
Sec. 1. A certificate of analysis that complies with this article is admissible in
evidence on behalf of the state or the defendant to establish the results of a
laboratory analysis of physical evidence conducted by or for a law enforcement
agency without the necessity of the analyst personally appearing in court.
Sec. 2. This article does not limit the right of a party to summon a witness or to
introduce admissible evidence relevant to the results of the analysis.
Sec. 3. A certificate of analysis under this article must contain the following
information certified under oath:
(1) the names of the analyst and the laboratory employing the analyst;
(2) a statement that the laboratory employing the analyst is accredited by a
nationally recognized board or association that accredits crime laboratories;
(3) a description of the analyst's educational background, training, and experience;
(4) a statement that the analyst's duties of employment included the analysis of
physical evidence for one or more law enforcement agencies;
(5) a description of the tests or procedures conducted by the analyst;
(6) a statement that the tests or procedures used were reliable and approved by the
laboratory employing the analyst; and
(7) the results of the analysis.
Sec. 4. Not later than the 20th day before the trial begins in a proceeding in which a
certificate of analysis under this article is to be introduced, the certificate must be
filed with the clerk of the court and a copy must be provided by fax, hand delivery,
or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the opposing party. The certificate is
not admissible under Section 1 if, not later than the 10th day before the trial begins,
the opposing party files a written objection to the use of the certificate with the clerk
of the court and provides a copy of the objection by fax, hand delivery, or certified
mail, return receipt requested, to the offering party.
335. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5) (proposed 1974), supra note 114.
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stitutionality. 336 Because Crawford does not answer whether laboratory
reports are testimonial, the statute would not clearly be unconstitutional.
Therefore, a court finding the statute to be constitutional based on the
presumption of constitutionality would remain honest to the law and
would avoid the fruitless task of attempting to determine whether labora-
tory reports are testimonial.
Justice Scalia and the six other Justices constituting the majority in
Crawford did not foresee the very significant problem their reformula-
tion of the Confrontation Clause would create with regard to laboratory
reports. The Framers, to whom the Court looked to discover the true
meaning of the Confrontation Clause, certainly did not contemplate the
problem. This lack of foresight on the Court's part has serious day-to-
day ramifications in courts all around the country. The absence of a
sound theoretical base in Crawford, coupled with the unacceptable
ramifications when the theory of the case is taken to its logical conclu-
sion, has placed courts in the unenviable position of what amounts to
having to decipher runes in order to determine whether laboratory
reports are testimonial. The "miasma of uncertainty" that Crawford cre-
ated is particularly thick in regard to laboratory reports and dispensing
with it will be no easy task. Unfortunately for courts grappling with the
admissibility of laboratory reports under Crawford, the only thing that is
truly clear is that things are unclear.
336. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 166 (2007) ("[I]t has been said that all statutes
are of constitutional validity unless they are shown to be invalid .... ).
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